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INTROD UCTION

Contractual boilerplate is a little like property. Such a statement might
seem like a category mistake. After all, contractual boilerplate language is
part of contracts, which, unlike property, are freely customizable by the par
ties. Contracts create rights between those parties, not against the world at
large. Nor do people who devise new boilerplate terms usually have intellec
tual property in the provisions themselves.
I will argue that, in an interesting and overlooked way, boilerplate is the
first way station on the road from contract to property. In particular, boiler
plate, like all legal communication, is the result of striking a trade-off
between communicating intensively in a narrow sphere or communicating in
*

Professor of Law and Cognitive Science, Yale Law School. A.B. 1 986, Harvard; A.M.
(German) 1987, Ph.D . (Linguistics) 1 992, Stanford; J.D . 1 996, Yale. -Ed. For comments and dis
cussions, I would like to thank James Grimmelmann, Jim Lindgren, Tom Merrill, Jonathan Nash,
George Triantis, and participants at workshops at Berkeley, Columbia, Northwestern, and the Sym
posium on "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts at the University of Michigan Law
School. All errors are mine.
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'
a more stripped-down formal way in a wider variety of contexts. Contract
and property form something close to comer solutions here. Contracting
parties are allowed to be as idiosyncratic as they like, but the idiosyncrasies
2
apply simply to their own dealings-usually not to those of third parties. At
the other end of the spectrum, property law deals in simple stable signals
with a wide currency, but the rules of property eschew a lot of contextual
detail. This makes property rights easy to adapt to many contexts and allows
those whose expertise is minimal to avoid running afoul of these in rem
rights. The simplicity of property rights also helps potential purchasers to
3
inform themselves about the rights in the process of acquiring them.
Boilerplate language in contracts is somewhere in the middle of this
spectrum running from information-rich contract rights limited to a particu
lar deal to simple standardized property rights availing against "the world."
Once this aspect of boilerplate is understood, an information-cost theory of
property can shed light on how boilerplate is-and is not-used in con
tracts. By definition boilerplate is meant to be used in more than one
contract, and boilerplate is more self-contained and less specific to a par
4
ticular contract than might be expected from contract theory. Boilerplate is
highly standardized, and when courts interpret boilerplate they treat it as
intentionally standardized and not harboring unusual meanings. In other
words, some portability of boilerplate is achieved at the price of tailoring
such provisions to particular contexts.
In striking this trade-off between tailoring and portability, boilerplate
takes advantage of modularity. In general, modularity is a device to deal
with complexity by decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules),
in which communications (or other interdependencies) are intense within
the module but sparse and standardized across modules. Two elements are
more likely to be in the same module if they are part of a dense web of con
nections, whereas they are more likely to be part of separate modules if they
are weakly connected in this sense. Modularity is thus a matter of degree.
For example, in a computer program, an initial version might have some
kind of a print function embedded in various parts of the program. Instead,
I. For development of this theory where context is defined by audience type, see Henry E.
Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1 1 05, 1 1 25-28
(2003).
2.
And when they do, the law tends to treat these third-party aspects of contracts in a more
formal standardized fashion than in contract law more generally. See id. at 1 1 77-90.
3.
Information costs include but are not limited to verification costs. See Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princi
ple, 1 1 0 YALE L.J. I, 30 n . 1 1 7, 32-33, 43-5 1 (2000) ; Smith, supra note I, at 1 1 25-26 (discussing
types of information and information cost); see also Benito Arruiiada, Property Enforcement as
Organized Consent, 1 9 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 401 (2003) (analyzing role of verification costs in orga
nizing property system); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 3 1 J. LEGAL STUD. S373
(2002) (elaborating consequences of verification costs for a system of property rights).
4. Contract theory posits a complete contract covering every verifiable contingency as a
benchmark, and the puzzle is why actual contracts fall far short of this ideal. Karen Eggleston, Eric
A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. RE V. 9 1 (2000).
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one can create a print module that can be called upon by other parts of the
program in standardized ways. W hen revisions are being made to the print
module or to the rest of the program the interdependencies (which I will
also call "interactions") are much easier to foresee. If a better print module
comes along it can be substituted for the existing one, or the success of the
print module at hand can lead to its adoption in a wide variety of other pro
grams. With the rise of object-oriented programming this style of software
design has gained widespread use.
Modularity carries with it characteristic costs and benefits. Modularity is
beneficial in that it makes complexity manageable. It also allows multiple
people to work on a larger problem, often in very specialized ways, without
incurring the costs of intense communication. Finally, modularity allows a
system to manage uncertainty; because each module can function and de
velop in relative isolation, these processes can occur without the need to
resolve uncertainty elsewhere in the system. In this sense modularity is said
to create options. Without modularity, keeping the options for certain deci
sions open would be prohibitively costly. Modularity achieves these benefits
by interrupting information flow, through what is often called "information
hiding"; only certain kinds of information can be passed from module to
module, reducing the need to know what's going on in the other black
boxes. As long as the design rules built into the interface are obeyed,
changes will not have costly ramifications elsewhere.
Although modularity is increasingly employed in areas ranging from
biological evolution to organizational design, some of the most dramatic
examples of the power of modularity and much of our understanding of its
implications come from the realm of computer hardware and software. A
key turning point in computer design came with the IBM System/360, intro
5
1964, which was the first truly modular computer design.

duced in

Nonmodular design that had prevailed before the mid-1960s had become
much too cumbersome. Similarly in software, the rise of the UNIX operat
ing system began a similar harnessing of modularity, and more recently the
6
role of modularity in open-source software like Linux is well-known. Most
relevantly for our purposes, the development of object-oriented program
ming (with the rise of languages like Smalltalk, Java, and C++) allowed all
7
When pro

sorts of computer programs to be more thoroughly modular.

grams become very complex, breaking a problem down by modules rather
than by flow chart can be key to managing complexity and allowing for
flexibility in evolution. In this Article, I will draw an analogy between writ
ing contracts and writing computer programs.

5.

See, e.g., 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES 6-- 1 1 , 1 69-94 (2000).

6.

See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 1 1 2
YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004
UTAH L. REv. 563.
7 . See, e.g., GRADY BOOCH, OBJECT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS AND DESIGN (2d ed. 1 994); ED
WARD YOURDON, OBJECT-ORIENTED SYSTEMS DESIGN: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH ( 1 994).
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The role of modularity in boilerplate has been largely overlooked in law
and economics, for reasons having their roots deep in the Coasean tradition.
As Tom Merrill and I have argued elsewhere, Coase assumed a hyperrealist
view of property which bears little relation to the traditional notion of prop
8
erty as a right to exclude from a thing, good against the world. Instead,
Coase, like the legal realists before him, tended to emphasize use-rights,
which in Coase's case would be the product of enlightened judges making
economically informed decisions about resource conflicts where parties
9
cannot bargain to the efficient result themselves. One would naturally ex
pect such solutions to be finely tailored, and they would have little reason to
track traditional exclusion rights. In a moment of extreme candor in the course
of his discussion of spectrum rights, Coase even expresses his view that the
10
concept of property "tends to obscure the question that is being decided" and
that "whether we have the right to shoot over another man's land has been
thought of as depending on who owns the airspace over the land. It would be
11
simpler to discuss what we should be allowed to do with a gun."
The importance of modularity has been easy to overlook in traditional
law and economics. First, the lumpy character of entitlements and their abil
ity to encapsulate and hide information does not figure in theories at all.
Instead, in law and economics more information is usually considered bet
ter. Exceptions to the more-is-better approach, such as the potential for
information overload, are not generally considered problems in the theory of
12
entitlements anyway. Second, traditional law and economics would not be
very compatible with modularity because legal concepts and formalism im
plement the principle of modularity, but law and economics inherits the
anticonceptualism and antiformalism of the legal realists. I argue that for
malism properly understood is simply one way of striking the inevitable
informational trade-off between intense communication in a narrow range of
contexts and more standardized-formal-ways of communicating more
widely. Finally, law and economics, even behavioral law and economics,
does not emphasize the benefits of modularity for human comprehension
and innovation, even though pioneering behavioral economist Herbert
Simon considered the very notion of bounded rationality to imply a strong
trend towards modularity in human problem solving and institution build-

8.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 357 (200 1 ).
9.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I, 1 9 ( 1 960) ("[T]he courts
should understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this is possi
ble without creating too much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take these consequences
into account when making their decisions.").
1 0.

R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. I, 34 ( 1 959).

1 1.

Id.

1 2. See, e.g., WESLEY A. MAGAT & w. KIP V1scus1, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION 90-105 ( 1 992) (summarizing controversy and presenting study); Richard Craswell,
Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 690-9 1 ( 1 985) (noting controversy over

information overload theory under which more information can cause recipients to ignore all infor
mation, but noting possible crowding-out effect of mandatory information).
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13
ing. As has proved true in cognitive science, a complex phenomenon can
be more amenable to study if the phenomenon itself is modular, as most
14
cognitive scientists now consider the human mind to be. Likewise, com
puter programmers are well aware that human minds deal with complexity
much better if problems are broken down in a modular way. For this reason
alone, modularity makes for good programming style. Furthermore, evolu
tion-even evolution not directed by a central intelligence--often gravitates
15
towards modular systems because of their ability to adapt to new conditions.
If so, the evolution of contract law and of privately circulating forms of boi
lerplate can be explained as the product of a similar evolutionary logic.
In the next Part, I will introduce the notion of modularity and demon
strate that it plays a pervasive role in managing contractual complexity,
particularly through its use in boilerplate provisions. In Part II, the Article
turns to a simple model of modularity in which such formal devices reflect a
trade-off between the information-intensiveness and context-dependence of
communication and its adaptability to a wide variety of contexts. Contrac
tual boilerplate falls between highly tailored contractual provisions and
standardized property rights in that contractual boilerplate presents external
ities that stem from the lack of fit between language used and contexts that
the drafter will not fully take into account. The information-cost theory
helps explain the mild modularity of contracts and why the devices used to
manage contractual complexity are reminiscent of those in property law but
much less draconian. Boilerplate calls for a more formal and less holistic
style of interpretation than do other provisions of contracts. The theory also
reinforces and refines the view that contract reading costs contribute to their
simplicity. Part III then turns to indirect evidence for the information-cost
theory from the limits of the legal realist approach to contracts and the well
known shortness of German contracts relative to their U.S. "counterparts."
The Article concludes with some thoughts on why modularity calls into
question some time-worn views of law as a "seamless web."
I. MOD ULARITY IN CONTRACT
Modularity is a method of dealing with complexity, and I will argue that
boilerplate plays a crucial role in bringing the advantages of modularity to
contracts. In this Part, I sketch out the nature of modular systems and how

13.

HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981).

14. The landmark study is JERRY A. FoooR , THE MODULARITY OF MIND (1983). Although I
am not claiming that there is any one-to-one mapping between modules we can identify in the law
of contracts or in contracts themselves and the modularity of the human mind, there are reasons to
think that there is some relation.
15. See, e.g., MODULARITY IN DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION (Gerhard Schlosser & Giinter
P. Wagner eds., 2004); Lauren W. Ancel & Walter Fontana, Plasticity, Evolvability, and Modularity
in RNA, 288 J. EXPERIMENTAL ZOOLOGY 242 (2000); Giinter P. Wagner & Lee Altenberg, Complex
Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability, 50 EVOLUTION 967 (1996); John J. Welch & David
Waxman, Modularity and the Cost of Complexity, 57 EVOLUTION 1723 (2003).
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they deal with complexity, both static and dynamic. With this background in
hand, the modularity of boilerplate becomes one of its most striking features.
A. Modularity and Complexity
Modularity is a key device for dealing with complexity, and understand
ing modularity presupposes a theory, or at least a definition, of complexity.
This has been famously difficult both as a matter of general theory and as
16
applied to the law. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is useful to go back to
an informal definition of a complex system proposed by Herbert Simon,
whose theory of bounded rationality forms the foundation of modem behav
17
ioral decision theory. At first approximation, a complex system is one
characterized by a large number of internal interactions, or, in Simon's
words:
one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way. In
such systems the whole is more than the sum of its parts, not in an ulti
mate, metaphysical sense but in the important pragmatic sense that, given
the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial
18
matter to infer the properties of the whole.

Modularity allows complexity to become manageable by interrupting in
formation flow within the system. Forming a modular system involves
partially closing off some parts of the system and allowing these encapsu
lated components to interconnect only in certain ways. This allows work to
go on in parallel and facilitates certain kinds of innovation and evolution for
a simple reason: adjustment can happen within modules without causing
major ripple effects. More sweeping change can call for remodularization,
but much can be accomplished without altering the modular setup. Cru
cially, human understanding of any system is enhanced by breaking it up
("decomposing" it) into modules. Simon offers a little parable to illustrate
the benefits of modularity:
There once were two watchmakers, named Hora and Tempus, who manu
factured very fine watches. Both of them were highly regarded, and the
phones in their workshops rang frequently-new customers were con
stanLly calling them. However, Hora prospered, while Tempus became
poorer and poorer and finally lost his shop. What was the reason?
The watches the men made consisted of about 1,000 parts each. Tempus
had so constructed his that if he had one partly assembled and had to put it
1 6.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 2 1 , 28 ( 1 995)
("The proper response to more complex societies should be an ever greater reliance on simple legal
rules . . . . ); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Computational
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 449 ( 1 997); Louis Kaplow, A Model of
the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 1 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1 50 ( 1 995); Peter H. Schuck, Legal
Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 ( 1 992).
"

1 7 . HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY ( 1 982); HERBERT A. SIMON,
MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL ( 1 957); SIMON, supra note 1 3 .
1 8.

SIMON, supra note 1 3 , a t 1 95 .
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down-to answer the phone, say-it immediately fell to pieces and had to
be reassembled from the elements. The better the customers liked his
watches, the more they phoned him and the more difficult it became for
him to find enough uni nterrupted time to finish a watch.
The watches that Hora made were no less complex than those of Tempus.
But he had designed them so that he could put together subassemblies of
about ten elements each. Ten of these subassemblies, again, could be put
together into a larger subassembly; and a system of ten of the latter subas
semblies constituted the whole watch. Hence, when Hora had to put down
a partly assembled watch to answer the phone, he lost only a small part of
his work, and he assembled his watches in only a fraction of the man-hours
19

it took Tempus.

Simon goes on to show that if the probability of being interrupted while
a part is being added to an incomplete assembly is p, then each interruption
costs on average the time to assemble lip parts, and the probability that
20
1000
Tempus will finish is (1-p)
, which is very small for p greater than .OOI.
If p is about .01, then Tempus will take on average 4000 times as long as
21
Hora. The modular structure of Hora's watches insulates many parts of the
watch from the damage of an interruption.
In software, modular structure can make the program being developed
more understandable to overall coordinators, at least in broad outline. Those
working on various parts need not worry about what others working on
other modules are doing, other than being assured that those modules will fit
in certain stereotyped ways into the overall structure. This allows work to go
on in parallel, and a team can develop software that no one mind could
comprehend in all its details.
Modularity also benefits groups of many kinds working together. A bur
geoning literature seeks to explain the modular structure of organizations,
especially those in the computer industry, as a result of the modular struc
22
ture of the products they produce. A dramatic example of the costs of
nonmodularity comes from the development of OS/360, the operating sys
23
Although the 360 itself was

tem for the IBM 360 line of computers.

modular, the manager of the software project, Frederick Brooks, took a
nonmodular approach and insisted on attention to interdependencies without
restriction. Those working on all the various tasks had to keep abreast of
developments by all the others and inform them about all of their own work.
The result was a nightmare. Within six weeks the central log in which all

1 9.

Id. at 200.

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 20 I.
Id.
See. e.g., BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5; MANAGING IN THE MODULAR AGE: ARCHI

TECTURES, NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Raghu Garud, Arun Kumaraswamy & Richard N.
Langlois eds., 2003); Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. EcoN.
BEHAV. & 0RG. 19 (2002).

23.

BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 6-11, 1 69-94; Langlois, supra note

22.
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this information was kept grew to be five feet thick, and growing at 150
24
interfiled pages a day. Brooks concluded that past a certain point in adding
workers, the communications costs of a nomodular approach even exceed
25
the benefits of a division of labor.
Consider an organization with ten people. The question is which of the
following organizations is more complex and why-an organization in
which everyone is connected to everyone, a strictly hierarchical one, a col
26
legial hierarchy, or a partial hierarchy, as depicted in these graphs:
FIGURE I
EQUAL PARTNERS/COMPLETE GRAPH

24. FREDERICK P. BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: EssAYS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEER
ING 76 ( 1975).
25.

Id. at 1 8- 1 9.

See, e. g. . RAYMOND GREENLAW & H. JAMES HOOVER, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY
26.
OF COMPUTATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 287-3 1 3 ( 1 998). For an application of graph theory to
hierarchies in business organization, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 80 1 - 1 6
( 1 986).
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F IGURE 2
(STRICT) BR ANCHING HIERARCHY

or

F IGURE 3
BRANCHING COLLEGIAL HIER ARCHY

F IGURE 4
P ART I A L H IERARCHY

Only the graphs in Figures 2 through 4 are modular. Two nodes are
likely to be in the same module if they are part of a web of mutual connec
tions, as opposed to the weaker connections of these nodes to nodes outside
the module. The more this is so, the more likely a candidate such a group of

Michigan Law Review
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nodes is to be a module. In the graphs in Figures 3 and 4, the contrast of
communication within the groups of three versus the constricted communi
cation, here through one member only, with the outside is striking. By
contrast, the first graph (called a complete graph because it has all the pos
sible links between the nodes) is not modular at all. In Figure 4 there is no
chief executive but a partial hierarchy with three modules, two containing
three nodes (persons if this depicts an organization) and one with four
nodes. It could also be the case that some of the links are more important
than others, which in graph theory is represented by associating a number
with the link between two nodes. One rough measure of complexity is the
number of links per node, as illustrated in the following table:
Links/Nodes

(I)

Equal partners/Complete Graph

45/10= 4.5

(2)

(Strict) B ranching Hierarchy

9110= 0.9

(3)

Branching Collegial Hierarchy

15/10= 1.5

(4)

Partial Hierarchy

12/9

=

1.33

More generally, for the complete graph the number of links is

n(n-1)12,

which increases much faster than in the case of the strict branching hierar
chy (which does not increase at all but sacrifices a lot of potentially useful
horizontal links), and the two hybrids, the branching collegial hierarchy and
the partial hierarchy, which are in between. This suggests a connection as
well to computational complexity theory, the study of the minimum running
27
Some simple-sounding prob

time for programs to solve various problems.

lems are provably intractable, and many are in a class that is probably
28
intractable. For example, the Traveling Salesman Problem sounds simple:
calculate the shortest route such that starting from a given city one visits
each city once before returning home. For three cities besides the home city

3 x 2 x 1
6; for 10 cities it is 10! =
3,628,800. The problem is that n! increases exponentially, and the general

the number of choices is 3!

=

=

problem is probably not computable except by approximation.

29

In the example given in the above Figures, the organization with connec
tions everywhere seems simple, but consider that communication and
coalitions could involve any subset of the people here; enumerating the sub
sets of a set is intractable because the time it takes increases exponentially

27.

See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GAREY & DAVID s. JOHNSON, COMPUTERS AND INTRACTABILITY:

A GUIDE TO THE THEORY OF NP-COMPLETENESS ( 1 979); GREENLAW & HOOVER, supra note 26.
For an application of computational complexity theory to law, see Kades, supra note 16.
28.
I am referring to the class of problems called NP-complete (nondeterministic polynomial
complete, or computable in polynomial time using a random choice of solutions with complete
luck), which are considered probably intractable (although proving this is one of the great unsolved
problems). See GREENLAW & HOOVER, supra note 26, at 287-3 1 3. For an informal introduction, see
KEITH DEVLIN, THE MILLENNIUM PROBLEMS: THE SEVEN GREATEST UNSOLVED MATHEMATICAL
PuZZLES OF OUR TIME 1 05-30 (2002).
29. The Traveling Salesman Problem is NP-complete. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 28, at
1 1 2- 1 8, 1 2 1 -28.
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The other organizations are modular in that within

modules there is intense communication, but these modules are only weakly
connected to other modules. In the hierarchical system these connections are
the vertical information channels.
The diagrams above can also be interpreted in other ways. For example,
the nodes could denote uses of an asset that could be the subject of property
rights. If so, one of the problems in deploying the asset is to decide
which combination of uses is best. In general the number of combinations is

n!/((n-r)!r!) for a set of n uses taken

r

at a time. Indeed, we may not know

ex ante how many of the uses are compatible with which one and which
those are. It may be that some uses are compatible if sequenced properly, in
which case the number of permutations (ordered combinations) is even
greater, that is, n!l(n-r)!. Moreover, as outside observers we may not know
the exact makeup of the set. One way to handle this type of situation is to
delegate the choice of many of these uses to owners who then interact with
each other and the state in certain standardized ways, as we actually do in
31

the law of property.

To do this we might divide the world up into assets based on natural
lines of decomposition and specify modularity between the resulting rights.
An asset should embrace known complementary attributes, but we can avoid
32
specifying them directly, by hiding them behind a simple right to exclude.
If A owns Blackacre, this means that A has the right to exclude unspecified
others from a given space or object (real or personal property). Dutyholders
likewise need not know much about the owner or the internal set of uses but
33
Exclusion

only to stay off and not to commit various kinds of invasions.

rights implement the "information hiding" or encapsulation that is the hall
mark of modularity. As I have argued elsewhere, the law is strikingly
stubborn about sticking with this exclusion strategy and only in exceptional
34
circumstances moves in the direction of direct balancing of uses. Indeed,
despite the best efforts of academics and Restatement authors, the law of
nuisance surprisingly still affords a major role for the seemingly very arbi
trary requirements of an invasion (by odors, vibrations, et cetera), which can

30. That is, enumerating the subsets of a given set requires exponential time. See, e.g.,
Kades, supra note 16, at 436 & n.103. Even a problem like maximizing the value of a fixed volume
filled with objects drawn from a collection of objects of fixed value and volume is probably intrac
table; known as the "knapsack problem, " it is NP-complete. Id. at 440-41.
31. For the role of delegation to owners in an information-cost theory of property, see, for
example, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 1021-45 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 169-70 (1998); Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S453, S470-7 1 (2002).
33. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 29-30, 71 (1997); Thomas w. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 794-95 (2001); Merrill
& Smith, supra note 8, at 359; Smith, supra note 32, at S475; Smith, supra note I, at 1 151.
34.
Smith, supra note 31; see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
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be explained as an effort to enforce the modularity of the property system.
Likewise property owners-again very surprisingly from a legal realist or
law and economics perspective-are not held responsible for anticipating
35
the torts of others. The effect of this is to allow owners to concentrate more
36
on the informational problems within rather than outside their module.
Only when interactions become serious enough is it worthwhile for the law
to prescribe the nature of the interaction (as in the law of nuisance or zon
ing) or for people to contract over them (easements and covenants).
This brings us to the question of what modularity has to do with con
tracts. In the examples above, contracting between parties involves a line of
communication between them that is intensely used and all the more so the
more their interaction is an ongoing one. A relational contract would involve
the most information exchange, a simple sale of a discrete good the least. One
might think therefore that modularity is relevant only to spot market transac
tions. And indeed it has been noticed before that markets and the property
37
rights that make them possible do have the effect modularization. Adam
Smith's invisible hand is remarkable in that results can be achieved with
individuals not needing to know much about other people and their goals, or
38
why prices are at their current levei. Each actor's information is encapsu
lated but can nevertheless be brought to bear on the decisions of others
through the interface conditions of the legal system and the market it supports.
But I will argue that the role of modularization in the law is much more
far-reaching than this and partly because modularization is a matter of de
gree. Before turning to contract, it is worth pointing out that property law is
modular on a more microscale than is often assumed in economics. Econo35. See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914). Wood's
treatise describes a rule that is very different from the law of negligence:
It is the duty of every person or public body to prevent a nuisance, and the fact that the person
injured could, but does not, prevent damages to his property therefrom is no defense either to
an action at law or in equity. A party is not bound to expend a dollar, or to do any act to secure
for himself the exercise or enjoyment of a legal right of which he is deprived by reason of the
wrongful acts of another.
1 H.G. Woon, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS: IN
REMEOIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY§ 435 (3d ed. 1893).
For surprise on the part of law and economics scholars, see, for example, Susan Rose
Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Ton Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 25, 35-38 (1989); see also Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior:
Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1988).
CUJnlNG

36. One aspect of this reduction in interconnectedness is the lack of owners needing to nego
tiate with others. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV.
(PAPERS & PRoc.) 347, 354-56 (1967); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1327-28 (1993).
37.

BALDWIN & Ct.ARK, supra note 5, at 100-14; Langlois, supra note 22, at 19-20.

See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
38.
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937) (1776) ("By pursuing his own interest [the
individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it."); see also Vernon L. Smith, The Two Faces of Adam Smith, 65 S. EcoN. J. 1 (1998).
Hayek's argument that markets are decentralized information processors can also be interpreted as
relying heavily on modularity. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN.
REV. 519 (1945).
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mists, including those of the neoinstitutional school, usually treat property
and contract as indistinct; property rights are basically any ability to con
sume an asset in expected terms, either directly or indirectly through
39
exchange. As with Coase, the tendency is to break up property into its
smallest constituent parts and ask about the incentive effects each piece has
on the relevant actors.
This misses a lot of what is going on. Property law does not atomize
rights in this fashion. Instead, the default package starts off with a right to
exclude from a space or thing (tangible or intangible). This is of course done
because people have an interest in using things and want to protect their
investments in those particular uses. But at this (foundational) point prop
erty law does not concern itself directly with these uses. Rather the right to
exclude is based on a very simple on/off signal, that is, whether a person has
entered Blackacre, has made off with an object, or has used an invention
(patent). This permits actors to proceed largely in ignorance of each other
and allows the state not to have to know much about the internal activities
and choices of the owners.
Still, at this point we might say that the only role of modularity is in how
the rights in the assets over which people contract tend to have some modu
lar structure. The main source of modularity in property rights would be that
people are not allowed through contract to alter the basic modular set up in
4°
the realm of property rights. Contracts may also be modular, largely be
cause parties design them that way. To take a simple example, a warranty
provision interacts with duty-creating provisions of a contract. We will re
turn to many examples below. For now, it is just important to recognize that
modularity is a matter of degree.
To save on costs among themselves, contractual partners may choose
modular forms, and there is a growing awareness in the organizational lit
41
erature that modularity is chosen in order to manage complexity. Even
asset-partitioning can be viewed as an example of information-hiding and
modularization: organizational law allows the information about the owner's
dealings with his creditors to be irrelevant to the enterprise's contractual
partners and sometimes makes information about the business's dealings
42
Defining pools of assets and segregating

irrelevant to the owner's creditors.

them in this way provides for modularity and reduces the complexity and

YORAM BARZEL, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2d ed. 1997) (defining
39.
property as "the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the
asset) directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange" (emphasis omitted)); Armen A. Al
chian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816 (1965), reprinted in ARMEN A.
ALCHIAN, EcONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 127, 130 (1977) ("By a system of property rights I mean a
method of assigning to particular individuals the 'authority' to select, for specific goods, any use
from a nonprohibited class of uses."); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 358, 376-78.
40.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 3.

41.

See, e.g., BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5; Langlois, supra note 22.

42. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000); see also Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996).
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transaction costs involved. It allows for specialization in monitoring assets:
asset partitioning allows creditors to specialize in which persons and assets
43
to monitor. Property itself allows owners to specialize in developing in
formation about their assets.
Boilerplate exploits modularity, and this modularity in turn allows for a
greater degree of complexity and specialization than would be possible oth
erwise. While specialization may arise without modularity, the information
hiding and standardized limited interfaces between modules enable those
who are concerned with one module to develop and use information relevant
to the module without having to worry about the impact of developments
from elsewhere or ripple effects from their own activities--other than
through the interface. As artifacts-including contracts and other legal rela
tions-become

more

complex,

more

specialization

is

called

for

specialization that modularity can support through its role in managing
complexity. First, at some point the artifact cannot be made by one person,
which requires division of labor. Even more complex artifacts cannot be
comprehended in all their detail by a single mind, which calls for specializa
44
tion of information. Modularity promotes both types of specialization,
especially the latter. A boilerplate provision about governing law can be de
veloped by those versed in choice of law without their having to know in
detail about where the boilerplate provision will wind up-and without us
ers of the boilerplate provision having to think through all of the possible
scenarios involving choice of law. Even in more specialized contexts, trea
tises can offer standardized modular solutions by experts in construction
contracts or software contracts, et cetera, without the authors having to con
sider how particular contracts might call for changes in the provision in
45
question. As we will see, nondrafting parties, supported by drafting party
incentives and certain interpretive doctrines, can specialize in their own
46
business without having to approach contracts holistically. And, finally,
judges can more easily afford to be legal generalists, which is to say they
can specialize in legal analysis rather than business custom, when a great
deal of contractual language they have to deal with is modular boilerplate.
47
There is little that is mandatory about all this. If a business organiza
tion is a nexus of contracts, then the contracts chosen will be highly modular
because the benefits in reduced complexity costs are largely internalized to
the contracting parties. If in some respects it is worthwhile to create intense

43.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 42, at 399-405, 424-25.

44.

BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 5.

45. Sometimes a lack of interaction with a relevant context increases the value of the provi
sion. For example, in insurance contracts boilerplate is used in order to make the contract invariant
to the actuarial context, thus allowing large pools of risk to be priced accurately. See Michelle E.
Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105
(2006).
46.

See infra text accompanying notes 136-141.

47. Other than an attempt by the law to channel people into a common vocabulary and rules
of combination.

Modularity in Contracts

March 2006]

1189

contractual interaction among themselves, they can do so, but not in such a
way that information flows increase to third parties, like other property
48

owners, courts, and, to some extent, successors in interest.

But modularity in contracts is more widespread than such a property
centric view would suggest, and extends to a realm of contracts relatively
untouched by contract theory-the drafting of contracts themselves. One of
the cardinal rules of drafting contracts is to be sparing with cross-references.
Each cross-reference is a source of interaction (communication if you will)
49
and so each cross-reference contributes

between provisions of a contract,

to complexity. In more extreme cases, the interaction can take the form of
potential cycles, which contribute greatly to complexity; some problems
50
involving finding cycles are intractable.
One source of nonmodularity-that is, interaction-is the mutual de
pendency of covenants. In modern contract law, a material breach by one
51
party can excuse the performance of the other party. Thus, in addition to
the explicit conditions in a contract, which expressly create interdepend
encies, the law treats substantial performance as a constructive condition of
the other party's continued performance. This is a systematic interdepen
dency between provisions, which the law provides and parties can contract
around. One can imagine alternatives. Leases are particularly interesting,
perched as they are at the interface between more modular property and less
52
modular contract. Originally the covenants in leases were independent; if
the landlord breached by not providing the premises, the tenant could sue
but would not be excused from paying rent, and if the tenant failed to pay
rent, the landlord could sue but would not be excused from providing pos
53
session to the tenant. In this, traditional leases were quite modular, but at
some cost. The model of independent covenants was not well suited in
particular to tenants whose expectation was (as it increasingly is) to ac
quire the services of a place to stay rather than a mini-property interest
54
Modern landlord-tenant

that gives them more discretion and more risk.

law has gone a long way towards making covenants interdependent, but
perhaps not quite as far in as in the law of contracts. This trend decreases
the modularity of these provisions.

48.

See Smith, supra note 1, at 1139-48, 1177-90.

49.
This is also a rule for drafters of statutes. For a very interesting article on statutory draft
ing that recognizes the benefits of modularity through an analogy to object-oriented programming,
see Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles of Object
Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & Pue. PoL'Y 227 (2000).

SO.

See Kades, supra note 16, at 445-66.

s 1.

See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS§ 8.16 {3d ed. 2004).

For an argument that landlord-tenant law is intermediate between in rem and in per52.
sonam and also correspondingly intermediate in its degree of mandatoriness, see Merrill & Smith,
supra note 33, at 820-33.
v.

53.

Paradine

54.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 822-25.

Jane, (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.).
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Another major source of modularity in contracts is the section on defini
tions. Definitions are now regarded with some suspicion because of doubts
about the limits of language. These concerns are, I will argue, often over
stated, and I return to the question of interpretation and formalism below.
While recognizing that no definition can be totally context-independent,
spelling out definitions increases modularity in at least two ways.
One is that the more explicit and formal the definition is, the less the
contract interacts with the contracting context--other provisions of the con
tract,

the

parties' behavior,

and

the

rest

of

the

transacting context.

Evidentiary rules associated with contracts increase contractual modularity.
Again, I will return to a more precise approach to formalism below, but
formalism is, I have argued, a matter of degree; instead of complete formal
ism

or complete context-dependence, the law of necessity calls for
55
The definitions allow closer approximation to a
56
plain-meaning or four-comers approach. The sneering by some (but not
57
all) legal realists and their successors at such rules is a little misplaced. The
differential formalism.

real question is whether the reduction in complexity costs from such defini
tions is worth the cost of devising them and the costs of potential distortions
inherent in any attempt at formal definitions in contracts.
Definitions also function as modules themselves. As in a computer pro
gram, other parts of the contract can "call upon" them without the need to
spell things out each time (which would entail a risk of error). Furthermore,
if definitions are not segregated and done once and for all, contracts are
open to an interpretive strategy where a use of the term in one part of the
contract can more easily be used in interpreting the term in another part of
the contract. This type of interpretation involves far more potential interac
tion-and hence more complexity-than in the case of a contract with a
section on definitions. Concerns about nonexpert factfinders, and juries in
58
particular, will be at their height in situations of high interaction. Also, in a
modular structure, errors in interpreting one part of a contract-here some
part related to a definition of a term-will be less likely to cause ripple er
rors elsewhere in the contract. But this insulation comes at a cost. It will be
only those terms that occur often and are subject to the problems of holistic,
highly complex interpretation that are good candidates for modular treat
ment. It turns out that boilerplate, while more internally complex than
definitions, externally serves a very similar role in promoting modularity
and managing complexity in contracts.

55.

Smith, supra note I, at 1167-90.

Id. at 1177-83. One aspect of differential formalism is the type of evidence admitted on
contract interpretation questions. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YA LE L.J. 541, 568-94 (2003).
56.

57.

See Smith supra note I, at 1177-83; see also infra Section III.A.

CJ Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (John M. Olin
Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 229, 2004). To this list may be added the objective
theory of contract. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Forma
tion and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REY. 427 (2000).
58.
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B. Modular Boilerplate
As contractual provisions go, boilerplate is characterized by a high de
gree of modularity. The word "boilerplate" has two senses, a wider and a
narrower one. The broad "boilerplate" refers to any standardized term in a
contract. But the word can also be used to refer to provisions that typically
are found at the end of a contract and deal with recurring matters like as
signment and delegation, successors and assigns, third-party beneficiaries,
governing law and forum selection, waiver of jury trial, arbitration, reme
dies, indemnities, force majeure, transaction costs, confidentiality,
announcements and notices, amendment and waiver, severability, merger,
59
and captions. It is this type of boilerplate that I will be mainly concerned
with in this Article.
Two of the most common types of boilerplate are governing law and
severability provisions. Each of these typically occurs near the end of a con
tract. I argue that a quick survey of actual use of these provisions reveals a
much higher degree of modularity than one would expect on the view of
processing costs implicitly adopted in standard contract theory.
Consider first governing law or choice of law provisions. Most such
provisions select the law of a single state or, even more commonly, a single
state's law except for that state's conflict of laws rules. In a quick search of
the Contracts and Organizations Research Institute ("CORI") contracts li
60
brary, out of 220 governing law provisions, the largest group specified one
jurisdiction (215 out of 220). Of these 2 1 5 clauses, there are three types.
First, the seemingly simplest choice of law provisions (79 out of the 2 15
one-state clauses) select the laws of one state without qualification:
GOVERNING L AW This Agreement shall be construed in accordance
61
with the laws of the State of Nevada.

Second, about one and one-half times as commonly ( 120), one-state
provisions select one jurisdiction except for that jurisdiction's choice of law,
which could otherwise point to the laws of another jurisdiction. A typical
example of the latter reads:

59.
See, e.g., TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFfING CONTRACT BOILERPLATE, at vii
xxii, 5 (2003).
60. The Digital Contracts Library of the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute
("CORI") [hereinafter CORI Contracts Library] is available with free registration at
http://cori.missouri.edu. An initial search of the CORI Contracts Library was run on December 4,
2005 for the phrase "governing law" contained in contracts filed between January 1 , 2003 and De
cember 3 1 , 2004. This search yielded 22,280 contracts. A subsr,t was created by sorting the results
by CORI Contract ID number and taking the first contract of each set of 1 00, along with the first
contract of the last group. This yielded 223 contracts. (A search for "choice of law" gave more re
sults but may skew the analysis in favor of the "other than choice of law" provisions, because such
provisions also use the phrase "choice of law.")
61.
Employment Agreement among Coi Solutions, Inc., Naipaul Communications, and
Geeta Naipaul-Denton § 20 (Sept. 30, 2001) (CORI Contract ID No. 1 868), available at CORI
Contract Library, supra note 60.
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Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in ac
cordance with the laws of the State of Ohio, without regard to the choice
62
of-laws or conflicts-of-laws provisions thereof.

Notice that this increases modularity and predictability. The law of Ohio
here will apply without interaction with parts of the context relevant to
Ohio's choice of law rules. Third and very similarly, some contracts (thir
teen) choose the laws applicable to contracts made and to be performed
wholly within that state, sometimes along with an agreement that the con
tract is such a contract:
Governing Law. The interpretation and construction of this Agreement,
and all matters relating hereto, shall be governed by the laws of the State
of New York applicable to agreements executed and to be performed solely
63
within such State.

Finally, a few (three) combined the language about applying the laws of one
state without regard to conflict of laws with a clause about applying the law
of that state that governs contracts made and to be performed entirely within
such state.
Very rarely (five out of 220) did a contract select more than one j urisdic
tion or tailor the governing law provision by issue. For example, this could
be a split by time:
GOVERNING LAW: THIS AGREEMENT AND THE RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES HERETO SHALL BE GOVERNED,
CONSTRUED AND

ENFORCED

IN ACCORDANCE

WITH

THE

LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH UNTIL THE FINALIZATION OF
THE FAIRNESS HEARING AND ENTRY OF ORDER REFERENCED
IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE, AND SAID FAIRNESS HEARING MUST
B E BROUGHT AND CONCLUDED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH; THEREAFTER, THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES
HERETO SHALL BE GOVERNED, CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE NEW MEXICO
AND THE PARTIES AGREE THAT OTHER THAN AS SET FORTH
ABOVE, ANY LITIGATION RELATING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
TO

THIS

AGREEMENT

MUST

BE

B ROUGHT

B EFORE

AND

DETERMINED B Y A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION
64
WITHIN THE STATE OF NEW MEXIC0.

Or it could be a split by issue:

62.
Stock Purchase Agreement by and among Trimas Company LLC, The Shareholders and
Option Holders of Highland Group Corporation, and FNL M anagement Corp. § 1 1 . 1 2 (Feb. 2 1 ,
2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 1448), available a t CORI Contract Library, supra note 60 .

Preferred Stock Subscription Agreement B etween Gregory Abbott and International
63.
Dispensing Corporation § 8.3 (Jan. 24, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 9), available at CORI Con
tract Library, supra note 60.
64.
Acquisition Agreement between United States Oil Company and Rocky Mountain En
ergy Corporation § 26 (filed Jan. 1 4, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 4 1 27), available at CORI
Contract Library, supra note 60.
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Governing Law. This Exchange and Registration Rights Agreement shall
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of
New York except that the authorization and execution of this Exchange and
Registration Rights Agreement by the Guarantor shall be governed by the
65
laws of the United Mexican States .

Interestingly, even though they do not seem significantly more expensive to
write, the sample contains only one provision that makes reference to the
laws of more than two jurisdictions:
GOVERNING LAW; JURISDICTION. This Supplemental Indenture shall
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of
California except (i) with respect to Article III hereof and the Guarantee,
which shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
the State of New York, without regard to conflicts of law provisions and
(ii) with respect to authorization and execution of this Supplemental Inden
ture by or on behalf of the Guarantor which are required to be governed by
the laws of the Netherlands. .

. .66

Even here conflict of law principles and rules are cut off.
In two of these multiple-jurisdiction clauses, the split is more apparent
than real, because the parties are simply (and redundantly) acknowledging
that a different state's law will apply to the internal affairs of a corporation
or a trust involved in the contract:

(f) Governing Law. The corporate

law of the State of Delaware will govern

all issues concerning the relative rights of the Company and its st<,)Ckhold
ers. All other issues concerning this Agreement shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York without
giving effect to any choice of law or conflict of law provision or rule
(whether of the State of New York or any other j urisdiction) that would
cause the application of the law of any j urisdiction other than the State of
67
New York.

Another similarly selects California law for an indenture but makes an ex
68

ception for the New York trust law to be applied to the trustee.

The overwhelming selection of one state, especially barring choice of law,
makes for extreme modularity. By selecting one state, these contracts are dis
placing off-the-rack law that might involve nonmodular and hard-to-foresee

65.
Letter Agreement-Exchange And Registration Rights Agreement-Pemex Project
Funding Master Trust between Petroleos Mexicanos and Credit Suisse First Boston LLC § 1 8(e)
(June 4, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 64272) (emphasis on entire passage omitted), available at
CORI Contract Library, supra note 60.
66. Supplemental Indenture among Transamerica Finance Corp, Aegon NV and BNY Mid
west Trust Co § 6.8 (filed Aug. 27, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 63374), available at CORI
Contract Library, supra note 60.
Executive Agreement between Ziff Davis Holdings Inc., Ziff Davis Publishing Inc., and
67.
Gregory Barton § 1 8(t) (October 23, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 42453) (emphasis on entire
passage omitted), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60.
68.
Indenture between WFS Financial 2003- 1 Owner Trust and [a New York banking corpo
ration in its capacity as trustee] § 1 1 . 1 3 (filed Mar. 25, 2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 48455),
available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60.
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choice of law questions, including the potential of cycling. By blocking a
state's conflict of laws rules, the provision is even more modular: the choice
of the law of a certain state will not vary with changes in the business or
69
contract context. Here increased length promotes simplicity through modu
larity.
Again, it is not writing costs that prevent more tailored governing law
provisions than the foregoing boilerplate. Tailored provisions like the "three
way" governing law provision or ones even more nuanced than that are not
prohibitive to write. The real problem, I suggest, is their nonmodularity, lead
ing to "reading costs" as I will interpret that term. The benefits from tailoring
do not outweigh the greater complexity stemming from interactions.
Severability clauses serve modularity in multiple ways. Their purpose is
to make the validity and enforceability of provisions less interdependent,
which increases modularity. The validity of each provision can be consid
ered more in isolation than in the absence of severability. As in many
systems, modularity insulates the system as a whole from the failure of one
part. A severability provision in a contract can be taken as an expression by
the parties for modularity and against remodularization by courts.
Severability provisions also are very modular in that they apply across
the board. A typical provision will apply to the entire contract:
SEVERABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT. If any provision of this
Agreement shall be judicially determined to be invalid, illegal or unen
forceable,

the validity,

legality and enforceability

of the

provisions shall not in any way be affected or impaired thereby. 70

remaining

We overwhelmingly do not find provisions that make some proper sub
set of the contract's provisions severable. In a quick search of a sample of
contracts from the CORI database, most ( 147 of 156) containing a severabil
11
ity clause had the across-the-board type like the one above. Again the
problem is not writing costs, especially when one considers that thirty-six
out of the 1 47 had one of several related extra provisions mostly to the ef
fect that if a provision was severed the parties would bargain in good faith to
replace it with a similar but valid one. 72 Moreover, advice books promote the
69.
For an interesting discussion of how adding this and several further phrases to a choice
of law provision prevent complicated issues from arising, see STARK, supra note 59, § 6.02[3], at
1 20.
70.
Warrant Repricing Agreement Among Aradigm Corporation and Holders § 8.5 (Feb. 10,
2003) (CORI Contract ID No. 1 470), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60.
71.
CORI, Contract Search, http://ronald.cori.missouri.edu/cori_search/client_search.php
(last visited Jan. 1 1 , 2006). The initial search, performed on December 2, 2005, was for "severabil
ity" in contracts filed between January I, 2003 and December 3 1 , 2004 ( 1 5,502 contracts), taking
the first of every group of JOO along with the first contract of the last group, listed by CORI ID
number, for a total of 1 56 contracts.
See, e.g., Joint Management Agreement among SGN LLC, Dex Holdings LLC, Qwest
72.
Dex, Inc, and Qwest Communications International Inc. § 8.8 (Nov. 8, 2002) (CORI Contract ID
No. 3527), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60 ("SEVERABILITY. If any provision
of this Agreement is held to be unenforceable for any reason, it will be adjusted rather than voided,
if possible, to achieve the intent of the Parties. All other provisions of this Agreement will be
deemed valid and enforceable to the extent possible."); Separation Agreement between DOR Bio-

March 2006)

1 1 95

Modularity in Contracts

idea of drafting an "essential terms" clause, which specifies particular terms
whose invalidity or unenforceability will cause the contract as a whole to fail.
And there were only a few examples splitting by the criterion of essentialness:
PARTIAL INVALIDITY AND SEVERABILITY. All rights and restric
tions contained herein may be exercised and shall be applicable and
binding only to the extent that they do not violate any applicable laws and
are intended to be limited to the extent necessary to render this Agreement
legal, valid and enforceable. If any term of this Agreement, or part thereof,
not essential to the commercial purpose of this Agreement shall be held to
be illegal, invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent j urisdiction, it
is the intention of the parties that the remaining terms hereof, or part
thereof shall constitute their agreement with respect to the subject matter
hereof and all such remaining terms, or parts thereof, shall remain in full
force and effect. To the extent legally permissible, any illegal, invalid or
unenforceable provision of this Agreement shall be replaced by a valid
provision which will implement the commercial purpose of the illegal, in
73
valid or unenforceable provision.

Again, these do not seem too expensive to write.

74

Either of these ap

proaches, based on inferring intent or essentialness, involve a higher degree
of interdependency with the rest of the contract, because it will depend on
the rest of the contract and the context of the deal what the overall intent of
the parties is or whether a given provision is essential.
A couple of contracts have a severability provision that is general with
only a narrow exception, thus keeping the interaction localized. One con
tract referred to a specific issue for special treatment (in the nature of an
acceleration clause):
Severability. In case one or more provisions, or part thereof, contained in
this Agreement or in any of the other Financing Documents shall be inva
lid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect under any Law, then without
need for any further agreement, notice or action:
(a)

The validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions
shall remain effective and binding on the parties thereto and shall not be
affected or impaired thereby;

(b)

The obligation to be fulfilled shall be reduced to the limit of such
validity;

Pharma, Inc. and Colin Bier § 13 (June 1 3, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 7036), available at CORI
Contract Library, supra note 60 ("Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is, for any reason,
invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions of this Agreement will nevertheless be valid and
enforceable and will remain in full force and effect. Any provision of this Agreement that is held
invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction will be deemed modified to the extent
necessary to make it valid and enforceable and as so modified will remain in full force and effect.").
73. Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Assets Among Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., Arris Interna
tional, Inc., and Texscan De Mexico, S.A. De C.V. § 1 2.6 (Nov. 1 3 , 2002) (CORI Contract ID No.
1 4 1 2 1 ), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60.
74.

See, e.g., STARK, supra note 59, § 17 .05[3], at 552-53.
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If such provision or part thereof pertains to the repayment of the Obli
gations, then, at the sole and absolute discretion of the Lender, all of the
Obligations shall become immediately due and payable; and

(d)

If the affected provision or part thereof does not pertain to repayment of
the Obligations, but operates or would prospectively operate to invali
date this Agreement in whole or in part, then such provision or part
thereof only shall be void, and the remainder of this Agreement shall
75

remain operative and in full force and effect .

One other contract, an employment agreement, has a severability clause that
governs within one section of the contract (on the protection of confidential
information) and a general severability provision for the rest of the con
76
Tailored severability clauses in actual contracts are quite rare, despite

tract.

the conventional advice and the apparent low cost of drafting.
Boilerplate contributes to modularity in contracts in specific ways. The
77

functions of modularity can be captured by a variety of "modular operators,"
and one can find boilerplate serving these more specific functions as well.

1. Splitting or Decomposition
Modularity involves splitting a system into relatively autonomous com
ponents. Simon refers to a decomposable or nearly decomposable system.
Decomposability is a matter of degree. The more each module is isolated,
the more decomposable the system. The trick is to find the natural fault lines
78
in a problem. In property these fault lines are around groups of comple
79
mentary attributes and sometimes track prelegal natural boundaries. To
some extent modularity can be imposed on a system by preventing some
communication that would have some positive benefit. To take a property
example from earlier, surely there would be some benefit in holding people
responsible for knowing the particular features of an owner and holding
owners responsible for anticipating the torts of others, but this benefit is
probably quite small in comparison to the large addition to the complexity
80
of the problems facing owners and dutyholders. Likewise with the numerus

clausus, which limits the forms of property to a fixed and finite list: one
might be able to find some property arrangement that is made prohibitively

75.
Financing Agreement between Town And Country Trust, TC Operating Limited Partner
ship, and TC Property Company II; and First National B ank Of Maryland § 8.4 (Sept. 25, 1 998)
(CORI Contract ID No. 8023), available at CORI Contract Library, supra note 60.
76.
Employment Agreement Between Power Efficiency Corporation and Raymond J. Skip
tunis § 1 4 (Nov. 7, 2002) (CORI Contract ID No. 260 1 ), available at CORI Contract Library, supra
note 60; id. § 1 0. This nesting promotes modularity over clause that directly separated an issue like
the protection of confidential information out for special treatment.
77.

BALDWIN & Ct.ARK, supra note 5, at 1 2- 1 3 , 1 23-46.

See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 22, at 24-26; Simon, supra note 13, at 1 95-98. This is
78.
sometimes called "factoring."
79.

See supra note 32.

80.

See supra notes 33-36.
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costly by the numerus clausus principle, but some such frustration costs will
81
In the

be worthwhile to incur in the interests of greater modularization.

case of property interests, these frustration costs are kept lower than they
otherwise would be because the very simple rules for combining basic inter
ests feed each other-and themselves-allowing them, like Lego blocks, to
82
In boiler

accomplish a surprisingly wide variety of objectives at low cost.

plate, certain parts of the contract are hived off into sections that deal with
questions like choice of law or arbitration.

2. Substitution
Because modules only interact in specified ways consistent with an
overall general function they are supposed to perform (again, think of a
print-control module in a computer program), one module can be substituted
for another as long as they perform the specified function. This principle is
put to widespread and powerful use in object-oriented programming, where
functions are made into objects that have hidden internal structure and that
can be substituted for one another. One of the great attractions of boilerplate
is that one provision can be substituted for another related provision.
3.

A ugmentation

If an issue is suitable for modular treatment, a new module can be added
to the system without much disruption to the rest. Thus on some issues like
choice of law, boilerplate can be added without having to worry about ex
tensive revisions elsewhere in the contract.
Notice that the addition of a module of boilerplate can be regarded as ei
ther substitution or augmentation depending on whether the frame of
reference is the contract itself or the contract as embedded in the back
ground of the common law or statute. Thus, to take the example of choice of
law again, adding a choice of law provision to a contract that lacks one is
augmentation if we are considering the contract as the system. But if the
contract plus off-the-rack law is taken as the system, the addition of the
choice of law boilerplate is the substitution of the boilerplate for the off-the
rack law (which might prescribe the state in which the business dealings
occurred as a default.) Precisely because the law of contractual defaults is
supposed to apply transsubstantively to a wide variety of contracts, it is
83

likely to be at least as modular as the boilerplate that might displace it.

Furthermore, because contractual defaults might be expected to be very
modular, when commentators have argued over whether defaults should be

81.

Merrill & Smith. supra note 3 , at 35-38.

82.

Id. at 36-37.

83. Before one could decide on the optimal degree of modularity here one would have to
recognize that any tendency of courts to favor off-the-rack defaults as presumptively fair and to
make contracting around them difficult might result in too much modularity in contracts. See
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 26 1 ( 1 985).
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more tailored to particular business contexts, the more salient advantages of
such tailoring must be offset against the loss of the advantages of modularity
84

that are the focus of this Article.

4. Exclusion
Likewise, a module can be subtracted without major perturbations. For
example the choice of law boilerplate module can be subtracted and the
general off-the-rack choice of law principles will apply. Consider the previ
ous examples of augmentation, which could work in reverse (for example,
striking a choice of law boilerplate provision). This is modularity acting
through the operator of exclusion.

5. Inversion
The process of inversion takes a previously hidden function, often re
peated i n many modules, and factors it out, moving it higher up in the
hierarchy of the design so that it is visible and can be called upon by the
85
various other modules. In software a typical example would be moving the
print function higher up and making it into a module that other modules can
86
In the realm of contracts, the definition sections can

use in defined ways.

emerge from such a process. Closely related definitions (implicit or explicit)
of a given term buried in substantive provisions can be factored out and
placed with the definitions in their own module.
6.

Porting

Modules can be borrowed from one system and plugged into another. As
long as the connections between the module and the exterior world (the rest
of the system, especially the contract and the business context) are few and
standardized, this process of porting will not cause disruptions. Porting is
one of the chief virtues of boilerplate and what allows it to become the sub
ject of a valuable body of judicial interpretations. Form books and treatises
only make sense with a high degree of portability. Indeed the complaint of
87
lawyers is that they imply a greater than optimal degree of portability.
At this point one might ask whether things could be otherwise. Is the
current degree of modularity the only way contracts and other aspects of

84.
One of the central issues in contract theory has been over whether courts are in a position
to create detailed default rules that would be sensitive to features of the parties such as their infor
mation, the risks they can bear, and who is the cheapest cost avoider in various business contexts.
Compare Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract law, 3 S. CAL
INTERDISC. L.J. 389 ( 1 993), with Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and
the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, I O I YALE L.J. 729 ( 1 992).
85.

BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 1 38-40.

86.

Id. at 1 38.

87. For advice on how to pay attention to the ramifications of boilerplate, see STARK, supra
note 59, at 5.

March

1 1 99

Modularity in Contracts

2006]

legal relations could be organized? The answer is no. First of all, as we will
see, some of the traditional aspects of the law coming under the headings of
formalism and conceptualism had the effect of making law more modular.
Moving away from them has decreased modularity, at the cost of added
complexity.

When

moving in this direction,

the

lessons

from well

understood areas like computer design and programming can point to over
looked costs of the highly context-dependent style of legal reasoning so
88
favored by the realists and their successors.
Another way to understand modularity is to examine superficially simi
lar artifacts produced by very different processes and institutions. In this
Article I am concerned mostly with contracts-and their contrast with prop
erty. Contract drafting has something in common with legislation, and many
of the features of modularity apply to legislative drafting as well. Tips on
89
In both contracts

legislative drafting include the use of modular techniques.

and statutes, cross-references are a type of interaction that defeat modular
9°
For example, the drafters of the
91
new Texas B usiness Organizations Code, effective on January 1, 2006,

ity, increase complexity, and create traps.

made a conscious effort to introduce a "hub and spoke" model that would
set out provisions common to all business organizations separately (for ex
ample, general definitions and provisions

about

mergers)

and

avoid

duplication (Title 1 ), with specific titles for corporations, partnerships, et
92
cetera. One of the members of the drafting committee set out how lessons
from object-oriented analysis and design could inform exercises like this in
legislative drafting. Although he does not use the term modularity, it is im
93

plicit in many of the lessons he draws.

This advice presupposes one-time drafting with a comprehensive view
that allows a conscious modularization in the first place. But not all legisla
tion is like this. Consider the Internal Revenue Code, which is often cited as

88.

Take one example:

As Justice Brennan candidly admitted in Penn Central . . . whether or not a government action
is a taking "depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."' The Court must
engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."
But is anything wrong with "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries?" That is simply one way of
expressing a pragmatic approach to decision making. Pragmatism is essentially particularist,
essentially context-bound and holistic; each decision is an all-things-considered intuitive
weighing.

The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COL UM . L. REV. 1 667, 1 680 ( 1 988) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 1 04, 1 24 ( 1 978) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
Margaret Jane Radin,

89. Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles of Ob
ject-Oriented A nalysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & Pus. PoL'Y 227
(1 999-2000).
90.

See, e.g.,

Scott A. Baxter,

Reference Statutes: Traps for the Unwary, 30 MCGEORGE L.

REV. 562 ( 1999).

91.

Tux. Bus. 0RGS. CODE ANN. (Vernon 2006).

92.

B lackwell,

93.

Id.

at

supra note 89, at 249-57.

268-88.
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the ultimate example of a complex law. One of the features that makes it com
plex is the large number of cross-references from one section to another, the
cognitive costs of which were colorfully described by Judge Learned Hand:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example,
merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference
to cross-reference, exception upon exception--couched in abstract terms
that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused
sense of some vitally i mportant, but successfully concealed, purport, which
it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after
the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters are the
result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting
out that net, against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recall
ing a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they
were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot
help wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that
94

the words are strung together with syntactical correctness.

This is nonmodularity. Not only are there many cross-references, but the
Internal Revenue Code does not make use of concepts that apply across dif
ferent settings. Notoriously, the Code does not have a unified conception of
95
ownership, to which other provisions could "call" in modular fashion. In
stead ownership is defined explicitly or implicitly for a variety of purposes
in particular parts of the Code.
Why is the tax code not as modular as one could imagine? Two reasons
go a long way towards explaining the relative lack of modularity here. First,
unlike in some areas of the law, each part of the Code is subject to potential
manipulation by parties and telling them the exact contours of what is al
lowed can be an invitation to evade in hard-to-foresee ways. Ownership and
control sometimes cut in favor of the taxpayer and sometimes against, and
particularly in antiabuse provisions, lack of detail can be manipulated by
96
Thus, formalism (including modularity) is less practicable in tax

taxpayers.

law than in other areas. Second and relatedly, the tax code is the subject of
intense lobbying and continual fixes in response to taxpayer manipulation.
This takes the form of changes that would be prohibited by a strong form of
modularity. New forms of evasion or new provisions, such as those govern-

94. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 1 69 ( 1 947). Seeing increasing
complexity as a trend, Hand went on:
Much of the law is now as difficult to fathom, and more and more of it is likely to be so; for
there is little doubt that we are entering a period of increasingly detailed regulation, and it will
be the duty ofjudges to thread the path-for path there is-through these fantastic labyrinths.

Id.
95. Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolu
tionary " Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 727 (1992) (noting that the Code has no
unified conception of ownership and arguing for extension of the approach behind section 1 286
rules for bonds with attached coupons to defining ownership under the Code generally).
96. Wayne M. Gazur, The Forgotten Link: "Control" in Section 482, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. I , 1 1- 1 4 ( 1 994); see also David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Cm. L. REv.
860 (I 999) (discussing sources of complexity for anti-abuse rules as opposed to standards).
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ing new financial instruments, call for very different conceptions of owner
ship. Some simple one-size-fits-all version of ownership would be a sitting
duck for taxpayers and lobbyists.
The example of the tax code underlines the importance of the process by
which a modular system will or will not evolve. There are powerful forces
pushing in the direction of modularity. The human mind-and this includes
those of j udges and the creators of artifacts like contracts as well as their
contracting partners, who need to be persuaded to reach an agreement
finds modular structures much easier to deal with cognitively. Further, in
any environment in which these forms are subject to selection pressure,
modularity may have major advantages. In a wide variety of settings, modu
lar structures possess an advantage in terms of evolvability. A module can be
added, subtracted, altered, et cetera, in response to stress from outside the
system, without causing the rest of the system to fail. That modularity is a
way of allowing complex systems to be more adaptive is now central to bio
97
logical models of evolution. Even modularization of the system itself can
be favored in the evolution of evolvability.
When modularization is planned rather than evolved, it is difficult to es
tablish which version of a decomposition (or even degree of decomposition)
of a problem is the right one. Moreover, those creating systems do not al
ways have the right incentives to adopt the optimal degree of modularity.
People writing a contract or those creating a property interest may not care
enough about the wider system of legal relations and the audiences for
rights who have no say in the creation of idiosyncrasies by the parties them
selves. I tum to these incentive problems and the externalities they give rise
to in the next Part.
Before turning to a simple model of the role of modularity in defining
legal relations, it is worthwhile to consider how the benefits and costs of
modularity differ depending on the nature of the parties. Between sophis
ticated parties, one might think that common knowledge would make
modularity unnecessary. The more parties are familiar with and can trust
98
Nonetheless, complex

each other, the less they have to worry about traps.

interaction is difficult to deal with even for the sophisticated-a point to
which I return in the next Part. But for now consider relatively unsophisticated
parties. While it is true that sometimes marginal consumers can discipline
sellers into offering efficient terms to everyone, the conditions for this to hap
99
If not, doctrines like procedural unconscionability (and

pen may not hold.

97.

See sources cited supra note 1 5.

98.

The possibility of strategic behavior may make any system vulnerable. A modular system
might be more easily manipulated because it is easy for the opportunist to understand or it can be
difficult to game because the system has been designed to resist such behavior (and modularity can
make such defensive design easier for the architect to achieve).

99. See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The law and Economics of Consumer Fi
nance, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 1 68, 1 70-77 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, lmpelfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69
VA. L. REV. 1 387, 1 401-29 ( 1 983) (showing that, just as with price diversity where consumers
prefer one price, the variety of contract terms can affect consumer search costs); Alan Schwartz &
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reasonable expectations in insurance law) can give consumers some assur
ance that they will not be out in the cold if they treat various contractual
provisions as modular. ' 00 The internal workings of a provision, particularly
if it looks standard but actually is not, should be treated as if it is standard
unless prominent notice is given.

101

Prominent notice is a more expensive

way to communicate-what I will call intensive in the following-and its
benefits are subject to increasing marginal cost. (Putting the whole con
tract in boldface doesn ' t do much.)
Likewise the doctrine of contra proferentem is usually justified on the
basis that the drafter, often but not always the more sophisticated party,
might otherwise have an incentive to leave strategic ambiguities.

102

Under

the contra proferentem rule, ambiguities are resolved in favor of the
nondrafting party. The drafter is presumed to be the cheapest cost avoider.
For present purposes it is worth pointing out that the contra proferentem rule
means that the costs of complexity are brought home to the one putting the
complexity there. Ambiguity is often the result of less-than-complete modu
larization; to resolve the ambiguity one must resort to context-either of the
rest of the contract or of the deal itself. The contra proferentem rule trun
cates this type of interaction between a provision and its context and
supplies the reading more favorable to the nondrafting party. This requires a
minimal use of context by the judge and causes the drafting party to tend to
avoid modularity-defeating, ambiguous provisions. The contra proferentem
rule, however, should not be absolute. We want the drafting party to avoid
ambiguity but not to try to eliminate every ambiguity-an unattainable, or at

Louis L. Wilde. Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Eco
nomic Analysis, 1 27 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 646-48 ( 1 979); Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality
Does the Market Permit? (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Paper No. 29, 2005), avail
able at http://law.bepress.com/alea/l 5th/art29).
JOO. Much of the cases and commentary view with suspicion a contracting process character
ized by a "lack of a meaningful choice . . . . consider[ing] . . . all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, including [t]he manner in which the contract was entered, whether each party had a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, and whether the important terms
[were] hidden in a maze of fine print." Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash.
1 975) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (internal
quotations omitted) (second and third alterations in original)); see ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICH
NESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT
L AW 1 38 ( 1 997); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (2002). The information-cost theory suggests sharpening the
issue to whether market conditions permit a seller to push nonmodularity well beyond the optimal
point. An obvious case would be one in which a consumer contract was much less modular than a
similar contract between sophisticated parties. Putting this idea into practice would not be easy but
might weed out obvious cases of abuse. On the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see, for exam
ple, KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PuBLIC POLICY
( 1 986), and Hillman & Rachlinski, supra, at 459-60. Again, if the doctrine allows consumers not to
read but to rely on the presence of only reasonable boilerplate, the reasonableness of the boilerplate
should tum in part on the degree of modularization.
l 0 l . This familiar notice-giving strategy is particularly favored in contexts that straddle the
contract-property divide in that the dutyholders are either numerous or indefinite. See Merrill &
Smith, supra note 33, at 803-09.
1 02. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory ofInsurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 53 1 ( 1 996); Posner, supra note 58, at 37.
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least not cost-effective, ideal. w3 Nor, without more, is it obvious that the
drafting party should be an unlimited insurer for all remaining ambiguity no
matter how unforeseeable and unsusceptible to manipulation. As with the
plain-meaning rule and prohibitions on extrinsic evidence, the point is that
normatively the law should favor an approach that pushes drafting parties in
the

direction

of

minimizing-not

eliminating-information

costs

to

nondrafting parties, particularly unsophisticated ones.
II. A M oDEL OF MODULARITY IN CONTRACT B o1LERPLATE
In this Part, I present a model of modularity in contractual boilerplate
which captures how boilerplate is intermediate between contract and prop
erty. Once we apply the tools of information theory, we can show that
context-dependence and its converse, formality, are matters of degree. If so,
this calls into question the assumption in the traditional debate between real
ism and formalism that context-independence would have to be potentially
total for formalism to make sense. Modularity, like other devices, pushes
legal relations away from context-dependence and towards formality, but the
real questions are what degree of modularity is optimal in various contexts
and who has an incentive to bring the degree of modularity in a contract or
other written instrument towards this optimal point.
A. Formalism and Context-Dependence
B efore turning to a theory of optimal modularity, consider context
dependence and formality. The legal realists took the formalists of the late
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to be arguing that language could
be perfectly independent of context and that law could partly for that reason
104
be an autonomous discipline, "legal science."
Many realists believed that
once they could show that interpreters relied on context even a little, that
105
formalism was dead. And the formalists, not being big on theory, had little
to counter with.
B ut formalism is a matter of degree, and this is fatal to the classic hyper
realist argument. For our purposes, a very u seful definition of formalism is
that offered by Francis Heylighen: formalism is the degree of invariance to
106
context.
Thus, mathematical notation is very formal because each state
ment is expressed in a system with a precise syntax and semantics that allows
interpretation to be largely, although not completely, context-dependent. Well
known results point to the fact that ultimately some element of interpretation
1 03.

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 58; Smith, supra note 1 .

1 04. See, e.g., Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36
IND. L. REV. 57, 59-68 (2003) (discussing formalism as autonomous conceptualism as among varie
ties of formalism opposed by realists and their successors); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism,
Realism, 99 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 1 38, 1 1 44-49 ( 1 999) (book review); Smith, supra note 1 , at 1 1 77-83.
105.

Smith, supra note 1, at 1 1 80-8 1 .

See Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4 FOUND. Sc1.
1 06.
25, 49-53 ( 1 999).
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will have to come from outside·the system, but in mathematics this element is
107
at its minimum (which is not zero).
In their everyday work, mathematicians
tend to use a somewhat less formal system that requires more contextual
knowledge. Natural language comes in varieties that are more or less for
mal. For example, words like pronouns and demonstratives depend on
context and contribute to a lesser degree of formality. This has led some
linguists to propose an index of formalism in natural language and to use it
1 08

in statistical analysis of natural language corpora.

The repetition of noun phrases in contracts (for example, the party of the
first part commits that the party of the first part will . . . ) is an example
1 9
some would say an unfortunate example-of formalism. 0 But notice that
use of pronouns instead of full noun phrases increases the reliance on con
text and causes interactions of the type that are inconsistent with stricter
forms of modularity. Tracing out all the possible interpretations of a passage
with many pronouns can be very complex: there are many phrases requiring
the assignment of an interpretation and the interpretations can interact in
ways that are sometimes hard to foresee. 1 10
Context-dependence and formalism have costs and benefits that are mir
ror images of each other. It is simply not the case that we always want
maximum or minimum context-dependence (minimum or maximum formal
ism). Context-dependence allows messages to be short given the amount of
information conveyed. Where those communicating share a lot of back
ground knowledge, lack of formalism does not lead to misunderstanding
because the parties can converge on an interpretation using their background
knowledge. This sort of thing happens in everyday conversation in ways that
are sophisticated but easy to ignore.
In everyday conversation a great deal of information can be packed into
few words because both parties can rely on what Grice called the Coopera
tive Principle: "[m]ake your conversational contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the

1 07. Id. at 34-38 (discussing nature of definitions, primitive terms, and "intrinsic limitations
principles " such as Godel 's incompleteness theorem).
1 08. See, e.g., Jean-Marc Dewaele, How to Measure Formality of Speech? A Model of Syn
chronic Variation, in APPROACHES TO SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 1 1 9 (Kari Sajavaara &
Courtney Fairweather eds., 1 996); see also Jean-Marc Dewaele, Style-Shifting in Oral Interlan
guage: Quantification and Definition, in THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERLANGUAGE 233 (Lynn
Eubank, Larry Selinker & Michael Sharwood Smith eds., 1 995); Heylighen, supra note 1 06, at 4953.
1 09. See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 7 1 -73 ( 1 999). The use of noun phrases in
stead of pronouns is a familiar aspect of context-dependence (called indexicality) and features in
Dewaele's constructed variable of formalism. See sources cited supra note 108.
1 10. Pronoun reference is one of the most studied topics among generative grammarians. See,
e.g., GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY McCONNELL-GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN INTRO
DUCTION TO SEMANTICS 330-33 (2d ed. 2000) ; RICHARD MONTAGUE, FORMAL PHILOSOPHY:
SELECTED PAPERS OF RICHARD MONTAGUE (Richmond H. Thomason ed., 1 974); Yehoshua Bar
Hillel, Indexical Expressions, 63 MIND 359 ( 1 954).
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talk exchange in which you are engaged."

111

Because of this general princi

ple and the background knowledge shared by the parties to a conversation,
much can be communicated via conversational implicature.

1 11

For example,

people usually say something like "It's cold" in order to get someone stand
ing near an open window to close it, rather than something like "I hereby
request that you, being closer to the window than I, please close the win
dow." The latter version would be more effective when dealing with
someone who has never seen a window before. The second version is more
formal because it can work in a wider variety of contexts, but it comes at the
greater cost of more length and greater planning (not to mention greater syn
tactic complexity). The ability to lower the cost of the message itself by
using conversational implicature and context (including audiences' back
ground knowledge), versus the sacrifice of portability across those contexts,
is an example of what I have termed the informational trade-off: everyday
conversation is informationally dense (what I am calling "intensive") in that
1 13
When
it compacts a lot of information per unit of communicative effort.
we want the message to reach a wider audience and more types of contexts,
we have to engage in more (not complete) formalism by using messages that
are costlier to create and to process.
Notice that conversational implicature's reliance on context not only
makes conversational interpretation-usually called pragmatics by lin
1 14
guists-relatively informal, it also makes pragmatics nonmodular.
Modularity, like formalism in general, is inconsistent with heavy reliance on
context. Although it goes well beyond the subject of this Article, it is
worthwhile to note that many aspects of natural-language competence, in
cluding

syntax and even semantics,

have been profitably studied by

assuming that each of these subareas and components of them are imple
mented in the mind/brain by modules. Pragmatics is not one of them.
Grice's Cooperative Principle looms large in pragmatics and should sound
familiar to economists: it is the rational-actor paradigm in the realm of con
115
versation.
Instead, the assumption in pragmatics is that general cognitive
abilities come into play, and pragmatics either does not emphasize cognitive
limits (as in Grice) or focuses on limits on general, not modular cognition.

111.
H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 4 1 , 45 (Peter Cole &
Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975), reprinted in PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 22, 26
( 1989).
1 1 2. Grice, supra note 1 1 1 , at 30; see also STEPHEN c. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS:
THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL lMPLICATURE (2000) (recent development of
Gricean theory).
1 1 3.

Smith, supra note I , at 1 1 1 0-1 1 , 1 1 26-33.

1 14. See generally STEPHEN c. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS ( 1 983); DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE
WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION ( 1 986).
1 1 5 . See Jay David Atlas & Stephen C. Levinson, It-Clefts, Informativeness, and Logical
Form: Radical Pragmatics (Revised Standard Version), in RADICAL PRAGMATICS I (Peter Cole ed.,
1 98 1 ); Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FouNDATIONs OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 1 3 2 (Jody s. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000 ); H. Paul
Grice, Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in 9 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 1 1 3 (Peter Cole ed.,
1 978), reprinted in GRICE, supra note 1 1 1 , at 4 1 .
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By contrast, modular aspects of mind, like language competence (and vi
sion, et cetera), are easier to study precisely because of their modularity and
1 16
If central processes (as opposed to modular

the constraints that imposes.

ones like perception and language with specific neural structures) approach
universal connectivity, interesting patterns emerge because of the outer envi
ronment

and

not

from

the

constraints

imposed

by

internal

mental

modularity. I would like to suggest something similar for law and econom
ics. The more modular an artifact is, the easier it is to study, and the more a
decisionmaking process is modular and leads to modular artifacts, the more
amenable it is to the tools of analysis that are available both to economists
and cognitive scientists. I suggest that the reason that law and economics
has been especially successful in the study of the common law, as opposed
117
is that common law judges proceeding

to legislation and constitutions,

case-by-case have fashioned modular principles that are easier to analyze
than the typical outputs of legislative or administrative bodies.
What happens when stakes are high? Parties can invest in developing
background knowledge and trust or they can invest in more formalism in the
written agreements that govern their relationship. But where parties do not
share much background and cannot develop it cost-effectively, formalism
may increase the cost of the message but reduce error costs. Where people
do not share much background knowledge or have interests antagonistic to
each other, it becomes worthwhile to invest in greater formality in order to
avoid the high error costs. High stakes thus do not unambiguously point in
either direction if we take a very ex ante perspective. However, if we take
the level of background knowledge as given, then an increase in the stakes
as between these parties suggests an increase in formalism. And high-stakes
deals are associated with more formal agreements in this relativized sense.
The choice of a degree of formalism is subject to what I have called
elsewhere the informational trade-off. Intensive communication involves a
lot of information per unit of communicative effort. But increasing the
intensiveness of communication will require either incurring more com
munication costs or reducing the extensiveness of the audience and the
ability to draw on context in general. At a given cost there is a trade-off
between intensiveness and extensiveness of communication. Property is
more formal (less context-dependent), and, being in rem, is meant to reach
a larger audience. In general, property interests can be mixed and matched
and used in a wide variety of contexts. They are very portable in a way
1 18
Cer

that they would not be if they were tailored to individual situations.

tain features of a fee simple of a lease hold true regardless of the nature of
the asset and the holder of the interest. This makes property rights very

1 1 6.

See FODOR, supra note 14, at 1 0 1 - 1 9.

A prominent example of nonmodular legislation is the tax code. See supra notes 94-96
1 1 7.
and accompanying text.
1 1 8. The types of property rights are limited to a fixed and finite number under the numerus
clausus, and the ones allowed first should be the most widely useful. Merrill & Smith, supra note 3,
at 39.
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easy to decipher. It also makes furnishing notice to purchasers and poten
tial violators much cheaper.
Modularity is one method of reducing dependence on context. A modu
lar provision in a contract or a modular property right can be added,
subtracted, transported, et cetera, into new contexts. And the removal or
change of a module does not cause problems, because the module interacts
relatively little with the context. As long as the interface conditions are
obeyed, one need not worry further about the context. For example, if a
choice of law boilerplate provision is modified or replaced, one need not
hunt through a contract to find all the hidden connections that might lead to
difficult-to-foresee problems. Some attention needs to be paid to such poten
tial problems because formalism (invariance to context) is not and cannot be
complete, but a less modular provision would require a great deal more re
vising of a holistic sort and would greatly increase reading costs to the other
party.
B. An lnfonnation-Theoretic Model of Boilerplate
We can capture this trade-off and begin to explain the nature of boiler
plate and the costs of reading it by extending a simple isocost model of
information costs. Information is measured by bits in information theory;
1 19
The more im

each bit can eliminate up to half of a set of possibilities.

probable a message is, the more bits are required to capture it. Elsewhere I
have defined intensiveness of communication as the information rate
12
information per unit of delineation cost. 0 Likewise, we will be concerned
with how far a communication can travel. We can construct an index of
compatibility to context (extensiveness) by taking the number of contexts in
which the message must function, each context weighted by the probability
121
of its occurrence.
Holding the costs of producing and receiving a message about legal rela
tions constant, one must trade off the intensiveness of the communication with
the extensiveness of the set of contexts into which the communication can fit.
On the intensive side, a message can have a high information rate and heavy
reliance on (specialized) contexts. Think of a highly idiosyncratic contract
term. Or, on the extensive side, one can make the message easier to fit into a
wider range of contexts but will have to lower the information rate: spelling
things out will cause the rate of information per unit of communication cost to
1 1 9. See C.E. Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Part 1), 27 BELL SYS.
TECH. J. 379 ( 1 948), reprinted in CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL
THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 3 ( 1 949); C. E . Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication
(Part 2), 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 623 ( 1 948), reprinted in SHANNON & WEAVER, supra, at 3; see also
KEITH DEVLIN, LOGIC AND INFORMATION 3-26 ( 1991 ) (adapting information theory to individual
messages); FRED I. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 142 ( 1 9 8 1 ); R.V.L.
Hartley, Transmission of Information, 7 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 535 ( 1 928) (developing notion of
"amount of information").
1 20.

Smith, supra note 1, at 1 109- 1 1 , 1 1 26-33.

1 2 1 . Id. at 1 1 1 1 - 1 3 , 1 1 33-39. Here I take context to be defined by economically important
features of the environment, not just audience characteristics.
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go down. All else equal, increased extensiveness requires decreased inten
siveness. This can be modeled by an isocost reflecting a budget to be
allocated between average information rate (intensiveness) and the compati
bility with context (extensiveness). Points along the line connecting the two
axes in Figure 5 all represent different combinations of information rate and
wideness of context that are equally costly. Additional isocost lines to the
northeast in the Figure, not drawn here, would involve a greater level of

cost. In Figure 5 , this is illustrated with information rate (r) on the y-axis
122
and (weighted) number of reachable contexts (n) on the x-axis.

FIGURE 5
THE COMMUNICATIVE TRADE-OFF
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Communication costs should be incurred as long as marginal communi
cation cost is smaller than marginal communication benefit, but the model
here emphasizes how costs should be allocated between trying to compact
information (intensiveness) or reach a wide set of contexts (extensiveness).
For the same cost, one can communicate at a high information rate in spe
cialized contexts (high r, low n ) , or at a low information rate in a large set of
contexts (low r, high n).
On the benefits side, different combinations of intensiveness and exten
siveness have different values depending on one's goals. Otherwise, a single
mode of legal communication with a single level of formalism would be
appropriate in all instances. But this is not so. Consider first the contrast of
1 22. To avoid asymptotic isocost lines, the origin depicts the minimal unit of information
being communicated to one person.
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contract and property. In the case of contracts, particularly those involving
sophisticated parties, there are large benefits to be gained from error-free
communication with one or a few parties-the parties to the contract and
perhaps a third-party beneficiary. To some extent judges have to be commu
123
This is illustrated by isobenefit curve C (mnemonic for
nicated to as well.
124
contract) and those parallel to it.
Where someone is claiming a property
right, things are very different. Here one is interested in having the message
travel widely, but not much information is needed in order to secure the
benefits of property: a message to keep off works to protect investments
against all but a few interested parties. Moreover, there are advantages to
being able to transfer and compare these rights with similar ones used by
other people. This is illustrated by the isobenefit curve P (mnemonic for
125
property) and those parallel to it.
Now consider boilerplate. Like other contractual provisions, it is most
useful to the contracting parties. But it deals with matters that could be
walled off and dealt with in a modular way. As far as context-dependence
within a contract, the benefits of high context-dependence are less than in
other matters. Also, it is useful to be able to take a boilerplate term and re
use it, in which case context-dependence is not as beneficial as it might
otherwise be. The isobenefit curves for boilerplate, denoted B (mnemonic
for boilerplate), are in between those for contract and property. Their inter
mediate location reflects the fact that boilerplate needs to reach an
intermediately sized set of contexts (audiences, contracts, business settings).
Different types of boilerplate will be located at different intermediate points
and the diagram is only meant to depict its intermediate status.
We can now derive the optimal mix of intensiveness and extensiveness.
In each case we want to find the mix at the point where the isocost curve is
tangent to the highest isobenefit curve it can reach in each of the three situa
tions. In the first, core contract-like case, the curve C is tangent to the

isocost at point (ne *, re *) , which means that the right will be characterized
by intensive information directed at few people. In the case of curve P, the

tangency point is at (nP *, rP *) and the right will be characterized by less in
tensive but more extensive information. And in the case of boilerplate the

isobenefit curve is tangent at point (nb *, rb *) , which falls between (ne *, re *)
and (nP *, rP *) . Boilerplate is somewhere on the road from contract to prop

erty. Being part of a contract, boilerplate may not be far along this road, but
1 23. In contract theory, this comes under the heading of verification costs, which, despite
typical assumptions of contract theory, fall on a sliding scale. See George G. Triantis, The Efficiency
of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C. C. Article 2, 62 LA. L.
REV. 1 065 (2002).
1 24. Contracts between a few sophisticated and numerous unsophisticated parties might be
somewhat closer to the curves for property than are contracts between a small number of identified
and fully informed parties. For factors that make some contractual situations somewhat "intermedi
ate" between prototypical contract and property, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 33, at 799-809,
and Smith, supra note 1 , at 1 1 5 1 -53.
1 25. All the curves are concave because information rate and information extensiveness are
not perfect substitutes: one has to give up more and more of one input to achieve the same amount
of benefit with substitution of the other input.

1210

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 04: 1 1 75

among contractual provisions boilerplate is more property-like than others
in terms of the informational trade-off.
This model does allow us to derive a prediction about the relative sizes
of the extemality in the three situations. As I have argued elsewhere, exter
126
nalities emerge on the extensive margin.
Those doing the communicating
will worry most about those they deal with, but potential audiences that are
more distant--especially those not in privity with the communicator-will
incur processing costs not brought home to the communicator. This is the
basic reason why property, directed as it is at the widest audience, is most
subject to informational externalities and is the most appropriate area for a
mandatory rule like the numerus clausus that keeps the information rate
127
down to manageable levels for remote audiences.
But extensiveness can
be extended to other aspects of the context for legal communication. Com
municators will care about how a provision or other message fits into the
contexts (the contract and the deal of which it is a part) at hand but will care
less about other contexts. In the case of contracts this problem is small. Al
though it is true that there are network externalities from using standardized
128
Moreover,
forms, contracts also need to be tailored to the parties' needs.
future dealings with the other party will make more contexts relevant to both
parties.
Boilerplate is once again intermediate. If one used a more tailored provi
sion rather than modular boilerplate, one may burden the other party, and
the other party will find such a term harder to process and to accept. If so,
there will be some tendency to adopt modular boilerplate in order to assure
129
the other party. The more standardized boilerplate is, the more it can serve
this function, but no one party may reap enough of the benefits of standardi
130
However, law firms will have their

zation to invest heavily in such terms.

own boilerplate-which can serve as some assurance of not causing interac
tions and traps for oneself. The use of boilerplate thus lowers legal costs, in
part because it is simple and in part because this simplicity through modu
larity allows its reuse. Although this often makes boilerplate a public good,
131
and parties with particu

trade associations sometimes propose boilerplate,

larly high stakes will sometimes have more than enough incentive to provide
132
Thus, it is an empirical question

the optimal amount of boilerplate.
1 26.

Smith, supra note 1 , at 1 1 39-48, 1 1 53-57.

1 27.

See Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 24-42; Smith, supra note 1, at 1 1 57-62.

1 28. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contract
ing: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 ( 1 996);
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or
"The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 7 1 3 ( 1 997); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 8 1 VA. L. REv. 757 ( 1 995).
1 29.

See infra notes 1 36- 1 4 1 and accompanying text.

1 30.

See, e.g. , sources cited supra note 1 28.

See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH.
1 3 1.
L. REV. 1075 (2006).
1 32.
See David D. Haddock, Why Individuals Provide Public Goods (draft November 2005)
(on file with Michigan Law Review).

Modularity in Contracts

March 2006]

1211

whether lock-in will happen, even in the face of large changes in the context

that call for some remodularization. 133 While it is true that under certain as

sumptions about information these terms could be overreaching, the model
here predicts that they will still be more modular than they would be in a
world where trade associations were solely interested in putting one over on
customers.
Figure 6 derives the relative sizes of the externalities, assuming that it
increases with the number of contexts that are supposed to be reached.
Number of contexts and externality go hand in hand. To a communicator,
the costs of reaching some of these contexts will appear to be less than it is,
making the isocost line as it appears to the communicator, line LM, less
steep than the actual line LL, which is the "full" isocost line that reflects all
the costs of the communication:

FIGURE 6
THE D IVERGENT C OMMUNICATIVE TRADE- OFF
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The communicator's choice is

skewed towards excessive context

dependence, and the problem is greatest in property and least in contract.
Boilerplate is in between. The externality will increase with the excess of
1 33 . For arguments that network effects give rise to lock-in, see sources cited supra note 1 28.
For more cautious and skeptical views, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL L. REV. 479, 562-9 1 ( 1 998) (analyzing
network effects in corporate and contract law and concluding that systematically suboptimal con
tracting has not been established, and S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys,
33 J.L. & EcoN. I ( 1 990) (arguing for rarity of strong path-dependence and questioning canonical
example).
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the extensiveness chosen over the optimal level (generically, n '-n *). Con
sider the contractual situation. That benchmark point is at nc * where the full
cost line LL is tangent with the isobenefit curve C2, which is the highest
level of (net social) benefit attainable with this budget. Similarly for nb * and

nP *, for boilerplate and property, respectively. In each case (of contract, boi

lerplate, and property), the communicator will believe himself to be facing
the less steep budget line. This means that the communicator will believe
134
As the

that he can attain a higher level of benefit than is socially optimal.

degree of extensiveness called for by the situation increases, the gap be
tween the full and apparent budget line becomes larger; more contexts
means proportionally more contexts whose costs are not brought home to
the communicator. In the case of contractual provisions, this extemality is
smaller than in the case of boilerplate which is in tum smaller than in the
case of property: nc '-nc * < nb '-nb * < n '-n *.

p

p

If property, and to a lesser extent boilerplate, should be kept simple for
these reasons, this is somewhat counterintuitive because generally with
more at stake, we would expect more complexity to be worth incurring. But
higher stakes can lead to efforts at greater modularization. In particular,
where modularization has greater benefits, in boilerplate and even more so
in property, we might expect private parties and public authorities to expend
efforts on keeping things simple and standardized. Particularly if the kind of
processing costs here are basic to human cognition, the fact that judges or
other interpreters will themselves need to process legal communication will
have a tendency to lead parties to keep things simple and for the third-party
135

decisionmakers themselves to favor or even mandate simplicity.

This model also allows a new explanation of contract "reading costs"
and can be used to ground models based on such costs. The extemality here
is one of reading costs. Most economic models of costly contracting assume
that the main cost preventing ideal, complete contracts is that information
cannot be verified (to a third party) or that spelling out contingencies is sim
136
ply not worth the (sometimes low) cost. If a contingency is remote and not
too disastrous, it is not worth even incurring small drafting costs. In addi
tion, parties who insist on going into this detail may be taken by their
137
negotiating partners to be untrustworthy.
In other words, from a commu-

1 34. There is another way to derive the extemality, as discussed in Smith, supra note 1 , at
1 1 54 n . 1 74. By selecting along line LM when from a social point of view one cannot do better than
LL, the private actor is in effect selecting along a budget line KL. This is the actual trade-off being
made along LM taking social cost into account: KL shares a point with LL on the x-axis but is paral
lel to line LM . When the private actor believes he is at point M, he is really at point L on the x-axis.
The actor nonideally trades off r and n at the rate reflected in line LM (and parallel line KL), that is,
at a rate of - OL I OM. Notice that KL is tangent to the lowest drawn isoquants for contract, boiler
plate, and property (C,, B,, P,), again reflecting lower social benefits than in the case of C,. B,. and

P,.
1 35 .

Smith, supra note 1 , a t 1 1 55-60.

See, e.g., Eggleston et al., supra note 4, at 9 1 - 1 26; Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts:
Where Do We Stand?, 67 EcoNOMETRICA 74 1 ( 1 999).
1 36.

137.

See, e.g., Eggleston et al., supra note 4, at 1 1 7- 1 9 .
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nicative point of view, the emphasis has been on contracting costs from the
supply side-those faced by the communicator.
One exception to this supply-side approach is Eric Rasmusen 's model of
138
On this model, if two parties are con

contracting based on reading costs.

tracting, the nondrafting party (of any given provision) must read the
contract, but finding potential traps is costly and will be more costly the
longer the contract is. For Rasmusen, length is a proxy for complexity be
cause on his model, "a complex contract is a contract with one extra clause
139
added."
For the drafter, assuring the other party that there are no traps is
also costly. Knowing this, the party drafting will draft a shorter (incomplete)
contract in order to give this assurance at lower cost. By using a short con
tract, the reading party can enter into the contract without worrying about
traps or spending a lot of time and effort checking to make sure that they are
not there.
One potential objection to this theory is that one may doubt that reading
costs are so high. Why should long contracts be so costly to read? A few
extra pages can be read fairly quickly and lawyers are experts at looking for
provisions that do not suit their clients, especially if the problem is the addi
tion or not of a given clause. At least as between sophisticated parties,
contract length seems hard to derive from the costs of reading.
Once we move away from identifying complexity with length, reading
costs are easier to understand as an obstacle to complete contracting. Com
plex

contracts,

those

containing

many

parts

with

relatively

many

interactions, are difficult to process. Modularizing the contract can help but
may require omitting some interactions that would tailor the contract to dis
tinguish between situations. For example, one could imagine a choice of law
provision making reference to different problems that could arise under
other provisions of the contract and prescribing a different choice depending
on which provision is in question (which might carry with it some advan
tages where the contract is supposed to be performed in multiple locations).
If, to avoid complexity from such interaction, a single jurisdiction's law is
selected, incompleteness is chosen to manage complexity. This may typi
140

cally result in a shorter boilerplate provision, but not necessarily.

The costs of reading can help explain the modularity of contacts, but the
information-cost theory here allows us to be more specific about the nature
of reading costs. It is well-known among practitioners dealing with contracts
that boilerplate can be readily identified and mentally segregated, which is
possible because of its relatively stereotyped interaction with the operative

1 38. Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract
Reading Costs, ADVANCES EcoN. ANALYSIS & PoL'Y, 200 1 , available at http://www.bepress.com/
bejeap/advances/vol 1/iss l /art2/index.html (follow "View the Article" hyperlink).
1 39.

Id. at *3 1 .

1 40. It is true that one information-theoretic approach to complexity is to measure it by the
length of the shortest description in an agreed-upon language. The language and style that contracts
are written in give no assurance of satisfying the conditions for applying this algorithmic or descrip
tional complexity (also known as Kolmogorov complexity). MING LI & PAUL VITANYI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO KOLMOGOROV COMPLEXITY AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2d ed. J 997).
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More generally, modularity is a method of deal

ing with complexity-the type of complexity faced by one reading a
contract. Modularity can be regarded as making contracts simpler; with
fewer potential interactions to trace out, it is easier to convince a negotiating
party that there are no traps. Interactions make contracts more complex and
potentially harbor traps. Thus, a model like Rasmusen's should predict that
contracts should be more modular, but not necessarily shorter, than they
would in a hypothetical world of zero reading costs.
III. FURTHER APPLICATIONS
The advantages of modularity help explain some major features of boi
lerplate and their function. Boilerplate is more encapsulated and tends to
avoid interaction with substantive terms of the contract. This makes boiler
plate more portable and revisable, and makes assurance to the nondrafting
party easier to furnish. In these ways, boilerplate reduces reading costs, a
type of processing cost. The very notion of reading costs can be linked up to
well-known limits on human cognition, limits that find their expression in
other human artifacts, from computer programs to business organizations. In
this Part, I will provide further, indirect evidence of the importance of
modularity in boilerplate and in the process of contracting more generally.

A. Nonmodularity in Legal Realism
The legal realists were antiformalists, and I have already had occasion to
mention their advocacy of context-dependence-the opposite of formal
142
ism-in the interpretation of contacts.
Realists have been especially harsh
in their attacks on the four-comers rule, under which an integrated agree
ment is to be interpreted without extrinsic evidence, and the parol evidence
rule, under which parol evidence is inadmissible unless a contract is am
143
From the early-twentieth century, contract doctrine to some

biguous.

extent trended away from formalism and towards an increasing openness to
144
evidence of the contractual setting.
More recently, courts and commentary

141.
Scott Burnham advises reading a contract in several passes, the second of which involves
identifying the boilerplate declarations and focusing on the rights and duties of the parties, espe
cially how they are conditioned on the happening of some event. On the theory presented here this
makes sense: identifying and mentally segregating boilerplate occurs at the same stage that one
starts worrying about interdependencies. Scott J. B urnham, How To Read a Contract, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1 33, 1 38, 1 44-45, 1 47 (2003).
1 42.

See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.

143.

See Smith, supra note I, at 1 1 77-90.

144. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1 1 82-83. A turning point in this history of the parol evidence
rule is Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal.
1968), in which the California Supreme Court allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced on the
question of whether a contract was ambiguous. In typical realist fashion, Chief Justice Traynor
asserted that adherence to the traditional parol evidence rule would reflect "a judicial belief in the
possibility of perfect verbal expression . . . . [a] belief [that] is a remnant of a primitive faith in the
inherent potency and inherent meaning of words." Id. at 643-44 (citation and footnote omitted).
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have pulled back somewhat from the more contextualized approach that was
145
Whether this partial retrenchment re

the trend in the 1960s and l 970s.

flects in part the complexity of the task that relatively

nonmodular

approaches to contract law placed on courts is beyond the scope of this Arti
cle, but it is suggestive. Perhaps more telling is that the realists themselves
had difficulty maintaining their context-sensitive approach in one area over
which they had more direct control (and suffered the consequences of non
modularity)-the writing of contracts casebooks.
Contracts was one of the areas that realists saw as most in need of a
move away from the (to them) illusory autonomous concepts like offer and
agreement, and towards greater sensitivity to commercial, political, and
social context. For example, Arthur Corbin begins his treatise with an ar
gument

that

an

open-textured

term

like

"reasonable"

calls

for

contextualized decisionmaking:
It must not be supposed that contract problems have been solved by the
dictum that expectations must be "reasonable ." Reasonableness is no more
absolute in character than is j ustice or morality. Like them it is an expres
sion of the customs and mores of men-the customs and mores that are
themselves complex, variable with time and place, inconsistent and con
tradictory. Nevertheless, the term is useful, giving direction to j udicial
research, and producing workable results. The reasonably prudent man,
reasonable care and diligence, reasonable expectations, are terms that are
not to be abandoned, at least until we can demonstrate that others will
work better.

146

Felix Cohen, too, took the question "Is there a contract?" as the vehicle to
attack traditional legal analysis for being insufficiently empirically oriented
and not pragmatic enough, using anti-metaphysical and pragmatist rhetoric
147
typical of the philosophy of the day.
Realist lawyers are engaged in the
positive task of predicting what judges will do, and realist judges are asked
to decide based on social reality what the law should be. The charge against
the conceptualists that they engaged in mystical thinking was a common one
and carried over to their attitude toward language itself. Carrying forward
this rationalist, realist hostility, Frederick Philbrick made a patronizing at
tack on belief in the determinacy of language:

145. GARY J. AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND 'fwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRU
DENCE, at x ( 1 990) ("Impossible only a decade ago, 'mechanical jurisprudence' has made a
remarkable comeback, and a new legal formalism may yet triumph as the principal mode of [judi
cial] interpretation . . . ."); David Chamy, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842
( 1 999); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 1 3 1
( 1 995); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court, 8 1 CAL. L. REV. 43 1 , 436
( 1 993); Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000). On textualism versus contextualism, see
Goetz & Scott, supra note 83.
1 46.

ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 , at 2 ( l vol. ed. 1 952).

147. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L.
REV. 809, 839-42 ( 1 935).
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First we had better dispose of some superstitions. A primitive notion sur
vives in many parts of the world-it is perhaps hardly rational enough to
be called a belief-that the connection between a word and the thing it
stands for is closer than the merely mental connection between symbol and
object. Most primitive peoples imagine that the word not only stands for
but in some sense

is the thing.

148

The critique of the determinacy of language was central to the realists' call
for contextualized decisionmaking. 149
Interestingly, the realist who was least unsympathetic to the use of legal
concepts, Karl Lllewellyn, took the appearance of boilerplate as a reason to
enforce contracts according to contextualized expectation and not the lan
guage itself:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in
fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the
broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. . . . a blanket assent
(not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller
may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms.

150

The need for modularity suggests the strengths and limits of this argu
ment. In the consumer context, forcing drafters to be very clear if they want
to override usual buyer expectations allows buyers to approach contracts as
if they are modular. There is less need for the buyer to parse the language
and look for interactions between the boilerplate term and the rest of the
contract and the business context. However, where sufficient notice is given
or where both parties are sophisticated enough, the use of boilerplate can
harness the benefits of modularity by being interpreted without great atten
tion to context-not only course of dealing and industry custom, but also the

1 48.
FREDERICK A. PHILBRICK, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: THE SEMANTICS OF FORENSIC
ENGLISH 27 ( 1 949).
1 49. See also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 7 1
HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 ( 1 958) (arguing against Hart's attempt to preserve a core o f meaning in
legal terms and contending that all interpretation of even the seemingly plainest words requires
an inquiry into purpose). See generally Smith, supra note I , at 1 1 77-82 (discussing realism and
formalism in contract interpretation). James Bradley Thayer, even prior to realism, made much
the same kind of argument, when he scoffed at the "lawyer's Paradise where all words have a
fixed, precisely ascertained meaning" and argued that "the fatal necessity of looking outside the
text in order to identify persons and things, tends steadily to destroy such illusions and to reveal
the essential imperfection of l anguage, whether written or spoken." JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 428-29 ( 1 898). One exception to
this dismissive attitude towards concepts was Karl Llewellyn, who did not reject conceptual
analysis or broad analytical categories, but rejected its use at the level of rule application, espe
cially if it meant asking courts to answer unanswerable questions. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn
and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW 1 2, 17 & n.34, 22, 41 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); see also
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth That the U. C. C. Killed "Property ",
69 TEMP. L. REV. 1 28 1 ( 1 996) (arguing that Llewellyn did not discard property concepts when
eliminating older title analysis).
1 50.

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 ( 1 960).
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rest of the contract itself. Llewellyn's approach to boilerplate, like that of
the other realists, is ironically too one-size-fits-all in its preference for con
text over modularity.
In this approach to contracts, the realists were pursuing a vision closely
related to their bundle-of-rights picture of property. In the bundle of rights,
the realists stressed the social purposes of property and thus emphasized the
relations holding between people and took the focus off property as an in
rem right to a thing. The realists favored breaking property rights down into
ever smaller constituent parts (sticks) and redistributing the sticks in accord
15 1
In general, the realists systematically ignored informa
with policy goals.
tion costs. So as long as there was any benefit from tailoring or reliance on
context, only a lack of enlightenment would seem (to them) to stand in the
way of openness to these context-dependent approaches. Because they saw
little to recommend formalism, the realists were willing to throw out the
advantages of invariance to context.
The realist revolution was never quite complete in the courts and the tide
has reversed somewhat (and more so in the commentary). B ut there is one
arena in which the realists had to live with the consequences of their em
brace of context and disregard for modularity: their efforts to implement
their project through writing casebooks on contracts. The goal among real
ists was to make the study of contracts more responsive to commercial and
social realities. The more thoroughgoing realist approach went as far as to
organize contracts casebooks by the subject matter of contracts. For an ex
treme example, Harold Havighurst's contracts book proudly announces that
its "[c]ases are grouped according to subject matter and not according to the
1 52
and that this will mean that "[t]he part that relation

doctrines employed,"

ship, circumstance, and custom play in molding the bargain becomes more
53
The aim is to bring out contextual connections and to

readily apparent." 1

avoid conceptualism, both of which push in the direction of lessened modu
1 54
larity.
True to its word, the book is divided into parts for "Services,"
155
"Gratuities," "Loans," and "Contracts for the Sale of Goods." The part on

1 5 1 . See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 357-60, 365-{)6; see also J.E. Penner, The "Bundle
of Rights " Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 7 1 1 , 802--03 ( 1 996). For some realist pronounce
ments to this effect, see, for example, Arthur Linton Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock
Exchange, 3 1 YALE L.J. 429, 429 ( 1 922), which argues: "Our concept of property has shifted . . . .
'[P]roperty' has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bun
dle of legal relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities." See also Max Radin, A Restatement
of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 4 1 ( 1 938) (interpreting the Hohfeldian scheme from a legal realist's
point of view). For a more recent version, see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in
NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1 980).

1 52. A SELECTION OF CONTRACT CASES AND RELATED QUASI-CONTRACT CASES, at iii (Har
old C. Havighurst ed., 1934) [hereinafter Havighurst].
153.

Id.

1 54. What the realists wound up doing is not totally nonmodular. Even in bringing in context,
they did organize by contract subject area. Nevertheless, these groupings of subject matter probably
were not meant to have the kind of freestanding quality that units in a more traditional casebook
would have.
1 55 .

Havighurst, supra note 1 52, at vii-viii.
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156

"Commis

sion Agents," "Real Estate Brokers," "Physicians," "Services in the Home,
Care of Sick and Aged," "Rescues, Recovery of Property, Apprehension of
157
Criminals," and "Building and Construction." And so on (and on). Another
professedly idiosyncratic book, characteristically entitled Contract in Con

text, organized the course around a building dispute, with no traditional
headings.

158

The only major current casebook with echoes of this realist tra

dition is Stewart Macaulay et al.'s Contracts: Law in Action, which mixes
headings such as "Protecting the Expectation Interest," "Contract in a Fam
ily Setting," "An Introduction to the Law of Consideration," "Contracts to
Provide for the Old: Contract and Restitution as a Substitute for an Ex
tended Family,"

"Franchise and Employment Relations," and "Social
159
The book partially organizes on the

Control and the Inl.erests of Others."

basis of subject matter and emphasizes context over general principles. This
approach does have an organization but foregoes the strong modularity of
the traditional approach based on principles and doctrines. In an effort to
battle conceptualism, none of the organizational benefits of concepts can be
employed. At any given point, any piece of material is potentially related to
any other. It is difficult on this hyperrealist approach to hive off some mate
rial and treat it in even a semiautonomous fashion. It is a relatively
nonmodular approach.
This realist approach never quite caught on, and I suggest that the reason
was its disregard for the principle of modularity. Indeed, current casebooks
look a lot more like the traditional books Havighurst and other ardent real
ists were trying to supplant. Even Havighurst had to compromise in the
direction of modularity by including little capsule explanations. For exam
ple, in the Employment chapter, the Second Edition adds capsules on
"Unilateral and Bilateral Contracts," "Objective and S ubjective Tests of Con
tract Formation," the "Statute of Frauds," "Quantum Meruit," "Designation of
Parties," "Statutory Provisions," "Special Interrogatories," "Consideration,"
160
and so on.
Because fewer of the benefits of modularity were available on the sub
ject-matter based approach, many authors did not go this far. Even the

1 56. This is further divided into sections on "Compensation, Wages, Bonuses," "Quality of
Work, Conduct of Employee," "Abandonment of Service, Sickness, Death, Changes in Employer's
Business, Duration of the Employment," "Remedies of Employee," and "Remedies of Employer."
Id. at vii.
1 57. The chapter on Building and Construction is further divided into sections on "The Con
tract Price, Extras, Cost Plus Contracts," "Defective Construction, Departure from Specifications,"
"Delays in Construction and in Payment, Termination and Abandonment," "Destruction of Work
Pending Performance;' and "Assignees, Sub-contractors, Laborers, Materialmen, and Surety." Id.
1 58.
ADDISON MUELLER, CONTRACT IN CONTEXT ( 1 95 1 ). The author had set out his views on
contracts casebooks in Addison Mueller, There ls Madness in Our Methods, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93
( 1 950).
1 59. STEWART MACAULAY, JoHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, I CONTRACTS: LAW IN
ACTION, at vii-xiii (2d ed. 2003).
1 60. HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 5-198
(2d ed. 1 950).
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radical realist casebooks had to compromise with conceptualism in later
editions. The failed experiment of organizing contracts casebooks by subject
matter is a testament to the perils of ignoring the advantages of modularity.
B. Comparative Contracts and the Seams in the Web of Law
If the theory based on modularity is correct, then contractual boilerplate
is in principle not the only way to achieve the benefits of modularity. At
various points I have mentioned the hostility of many legal realists to con
ceptualism and formalism alike. In this Section, I give a preliminary sketch
of the role that concepts play in a modular theory of law. In civil law, modu
larity is achieved through defining these concepts and providing off-the-rack
solutions in the civil code. Finally, I turn to how differential formalism
qualifies the notion that law is a seamless web.
At one level, concepts and formalism under our definition do go hand in
hand. The whole point of a concept in traditional conceptualism is its rela
tive abstractness and autonomy from the messy details of the factual context
(for example, business dealings in a particular industry). In other words,
conceptualism is one way (and not the only way) of reducing context
dependence. Again, because formalism and its reverse, context-dependence,
are matters of degree, one can err in the direction of too much context
dependence or too little. And one must ask which actors-private parties,
judges, legislators, and administrators-are likely to come close to choosing
whatever the optimal level of context-dependence might be. One assurance
for getting to the neighborhood of the optimal point is that all of these ac
tors, more or less, face processing costs, and so will have some tendency to
look favorably upon modular and formal solutions when interdependencies
present difficulties. The problem comes when decisions by any of these ac
tors have implications for contexts which that actor does not directly face.
One major difference between common and civil law, and German law in
particular, is that German law, unlike the common law, spells out concepts
161
very systematically in legislation. Conceptualism (Begrijfsjurisprudenz) was
particularly popular during the formative period of the German Civil Code
of 1896 (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch), which was a product of the late
162
and despite more recent approaches that downplay
nineteenth century,
the role of concepts, conceptualism is more pronounced in German law

1 6 1 . See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1 985); ALAN WATSON,
THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 1 68 ( 1 98 1 ). On German law, see, for example, OTTO PALANDT,
BDRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Peter Bassenge et al. eds., 58th ed. 1 999), and INTRODUCTION TO
GERMAN LAW (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1 996).
1 62. It came into force on January 1, 1 900. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRO
DUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 1 43-44 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 3d rev. ed. 1 998)
( 1 977) (Professor Gustav Radbruch, who went on to become the Minister of Justice of the Weimar
Republic, opined that the German Civil Code of 1 896 was "more 'the cadence of the nineteenth than
the upbeat to the twentieth century . . . ."'); see also Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the
Method of Civil Law, 34 Tux. INT'L L.J. 333, 340 ( 1 999).
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As a result, individual contracts do not have to devote

much effort to defining these concepts. Some of what a U.S. contract
would accomplish by means of boilerplate provisions is simply in the
background civil law in Germany. Claire Hill and Christopher King cite
this feature of German law along with a more homogeneous legal and
business culture as reasons why German contracts tend to be shorter than
164
their U . S . counterparts.
We can hypothesize here that German contracts are modular as well as
short. The structure of the civil law itself provides for a high degree of
modularity. To the extent that use of the system is quasi-mandatory, the law
in Germany pushes parties to a highly modular style of contracting, but
through off-the-rack law rather than through privately created boilerplate.
German law allows modules, especially those involving definitions, to be
omitted from contracts themselves. Both boilerplate provisions and the off
the-rack provisions of German law achieve modularity, but in very different
ways. It may also be the case that German law, along with an institutional
structure in which "notaries" vouch for the enforceability of contracts, pro
165
motes a greater degree of modularity than U.S. law.
Given that the
contracting context at least until recently has been quite different in Ger
many, it is beyond the scope of this Article whether a possibly greater
degree of modularity heavily promoted by the legal system is an advantage
or not.
One of the functions of defining concepts is to help differentiate various
areas of the law from each other. Thus, if property involves exclusion and in
rem nature, this helps define the scope of property vis-a-vis contract. This
type of differentiation is ingrained in the civil law tradition but has fallen out
of favor in common law jurisdictions, especially in the United States. More
recently, some English philosophers of law, especially those taking up Jo
seph Raz's problem of "individuating" laws, have pursued the question of
166
I suggest that the benefits of

defining branches of the law philosophically.

doing this are closely tied to the role of modularity in managing complexity.
Recognizing this role of modularity calls into question the often
repeated metaphor that law is a "seamless web." This is a well-worn cliche,
partly because it potentially appeals to those of very different views on con
167
ceptualism and formalism. To traditional conceptualists and formalists, the

1 63.

See, e.g., Baudenbacher, supra note 1 62, at 336--3 7.

Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer
Words?, 79 CHI. - KENT L. REv. 889 (2004).
1 64.

1 65. Beurkundungsgesetz [Notarial Authentication Act], Aug. 28, 1 969 BGBI . I at 1 5 1 3,
§§ 17-2 1 (F.R.G.).
1 66. PENNER, supra note 33, at 32-68; JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 7092, 1 40-47 (2d ed. 1 980).
1 67. Frederic William Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 LAW Q. REv. 1 3,
1 3 ( 1 898) ("Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavours to tell a piece of it must
feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web."); see also FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WIL
LIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1 (2d ed. 1 899); Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital
World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403, 403-04 ( 1 993) ("This metaphor
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phrase is cautionary in that a change may have unanticipated consequences.
realists, who are skeptical about the neatness and coherence implied by the
traditional invocations of the "seamless web" metaphor, make a case for a
different sort of seamlessness themselves: a need to look beyond narrow
doctrine for sensible solutions that take into account how law in general can
168
To the realists, law is not even autonomous, but
solve social problems.
rather seamlessly connected to social context.
That law has internal and external connections of this sort is hard to
deny. But in the case of formalism versus contextualism, the seamlessness
of law is a matter of degree. Maximum seamlessness implies no benefit to
modularity. Regardless of whether they explicitly thought of their task this
way, the conceptualists and traditional treatise writers divided law into sub
ject areas (and subareas) and distinguished concepts. By differentiating
areas of law and defining-and limiting-the connections between them
and between law and its context, the designers of a legal system can achieve
some of the benefits of modularity in managing complexity. These include
greater ease of use and more adaptability to certain kinds of change in the
external environment that call for change in the law itself. Given the central
role modularity plays in many facets of human existence and its connection
to limits on human cognition, it would be quite surprising if law called for a
comer solution of seamlessness.

CONCLUSION
The modularity of boilerplate is but one aspect of a much larger phe
nomenon that is pervasive throughout law and the rest of human creation of
artifacts. Ultimately, modularity reflects the limits of human cognition.
Modularity is a much more promising place to look for the effects of those

suggests that law not only has an intricate structure, but also that all parts of the law fit together
smoothly, that each part is linked to every other part and that the whole arrangement grows and
evolves according to plan.").
1 68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Before arguing that legal norms block consid
eration of some kinds of information, thus in this Article's terms increasing modularity, Frederick
Schauer summarizes the modem view of seamlessness:

The law is a seamless web, so the old saw goes, but so too is life. Just as the categories and
concepts of law are pervasively interconnected, the categories with which we divide up the
world are similarly conjoined. The demarcations that people use to organize their perceptions
and their lives are not rigid and mutually exclusive, but rather constitute a set of overlapping
and fuzzy-edged constructs, linked in such a way that changes in the pressure applied at any
one point in society are likely to reverberate throughout much of the network that is our exis
tence.
What makes these interrelationships important to lawyers is that law itself is undeniably part of
a larger whole. The seamless web of law is one component of the seamless web of life. And if
the seamless web metaphor is indeed as apt for life as it is for law, then changes in any part of
our social existence and organization are likely to be reflected not only in the content but also
in the very nature of law.
Frederick Schauer, Lawyers and Lawmaking, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1 14 1 , 1 14 1 ( 1 985) (reviewing
B RUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW ( 1984)).
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limits than in many of the deviations from rationality that have received the
•

•

most attention m recent years.

169

One of the most striking implications of the theory and the hypotheses
offered about boilerplate, contract, and property in this paper is that they
suggest benefits of formalism that have been overlooked by the realists and
formalists and their successors alike. Boilerplate is best interpreted in a less
holistic, context-dependent manner than are contracts more generally. This
differential formalism suggests that images of the law popular with all these
types of people are quite misleading. The image of the law as a "seamless
web" is appealing and has some truth in it, but it misses an important part of
the picture. What is deeply woven into the structure of the law is the modu
larity that human minds require in order to make legal artifacts useful.
Exploiting the benefits of information hiding and portability can be seen as
consequences of bounded rationality. 170 Modularity and other formal devices
are more important in some areas, like contracts, than in others, like prop
erty, precisely because these purposes differ from one area to the next. And
boilerplate is interesting and revealing because it is perched somewhere be
tween the poles of contract and property.

1 69. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcoNOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) ; Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. I 05 1 (2000).
1 70. This was Herbert Simon's view, even though he regarded the mind as a general cognition
device and did not emphasize the modularity of mind itself. See SIMON, supra note 1 3. Modularity
of artifacts like computer programs, organizations, and law itself can be important to human infor
mation processors even if the mind itself is not as modular as most cognitive scientists now accept.

